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Abstract
This paper presents evidence on the industry effects of bank lending in Germany and asks
whether bank lending to single industries depends on industry-specific bank credit demand or
on monetary policy as determinant of bank credit supply. To this end, we estimate individual
bank lending functions for 17 manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries and five banking
groups using quarterly bank balance sheet and bank lending data for the period 1992:1-2002:4.
The evidence from dynamic panel data models illustrates that industry bank lending responds
more to changes in industry-specific bank credit demand than to changes in monetary policy.
We report evidence in favor of a credit channel through bank lending, but find the bank lending
effects of monetary policy to be very sensitive to the choice of industry. The empirical results,
hence, lend strong support to the existence of industry effects of bank lending. In view of
this finding, we conclude that bank lending growth and monetary policy effectiveness crucially
depend on the industry composition of bank credit portfolios.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy changes are propagated through a multitude of transmission channels such
as, for example, the credit and interest rate channel. Both types of transmission channels
predict bank lending to change in response to monetary policy actions. While the direction of
the change is the same in the credit and interest rate view, the underlying reasons differ. The
credit channel view explains monetary policy induced movements in bank lending with changes
in bank loan supply, whereas the interest rate channel stresses changes in bank loan demand.
Apparently, the correlation of monetary policy shocks with loan demand and loan supply and
the consequent role of interest rates as joint determinant of credit demand and credit supply
precludes the unique identification of the interest rate and credit channel effects of monetary
policy.
In order to solve the problem of identifying the loan supply and loan demand effects of mon-
etary policy, empirical studies typically rely on disaggregated macro or micro data. These
illustrate the distributional effects of monetary policy by stressing within-group and between-
group heterogeneity of banks in terms of asset size (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1995), liquidity
(e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000), and capitalization (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1995). The
identification of loan supply effects builds on the assumption that bank heterogeneity in bank
size, liquidity, and capitalization reflects cross-bank differences in the severity of asymmetric
information problems and therefore differences in the ability of banks to offset monetary policy
induced changes in deposits with other types of finance. When stressing bank-specific charac-
teristics, the identification of credit supply effects is achieved by assuming that the response
of bank credit supply to changes in bank credit demand is homogenous across all banks.1
Besides, banks are assumed to serve customers which do not differ in terms of bank credit
demand and for which bank credit demand is determined by similar factors. These are strong
assumptions and their likely violation suggests the persistence of the identification problem.
The identification bias is likely to be particularly strong for Germany for two reasons. The
first reason refers to the housebank principle in German banking. German banks belong to
banking groups which confine their business to customers which differ in the degree of bank
dependence. Commercial banks are the housebank to large corporations, while savings and
cooperative banks are the housebanks to small- and medium-sized firms.2 In general, small
firms are more dependent on banks as source of external finance than large firms. The greater
bank dependence results from credit market imperfections which are more pronounced for small
than for large firms given that reporting and accounting standards become more stringent with
firm size. Credit market imperfections therefore cause the portfolio of savings and cooperative
banks to be biased towards bank-dependent firms and that of commercial banks to be biased
towards firms with access to non-bank sources of finance (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998a,
2002a). In view of these relationships, banking groups are likely to differ in the extent to which
they (i) face changes in credit demand and (ii) adjust credit supply.
1For details see Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) and Worms (2003). This is comparable to arguments
regarding the firm size effects of monetary policy, where it is assumed that the interest rate sensitivity of
credit demand does not depend on firm size.
2See Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for evidence on the role of housebanks as source of finance for small and
large firms in Germany.
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The second reason refers to the existence of pronounced cross-industry differences in credit
demand. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) attributes these to heterogeneities in the cyclical
and structural characteristics of industries. The cyclicality of industry output affects the
need for external finance through its effect on the availability of internal funds of finance.
Cross-industry differences in bank credit demand reflect dissimilarities in the amplitude and
frequency of cyclical fluctuations and in the sensitivity of cash flows to cyclical demand changes.
Structural characteristics such as the degree of capital intensity, firm size distribution, or
openness to trade explain industry differences in credit demand with differences in the costs
of maintaining and expanding production structures and with heterogeneities in the severity
of credit market imperfections and the corresponding access to non-bank funds of finance.
Besides possible heterogeneities in bank credit demand and in the response of bank lending to
changes in bank credit demand, the identification of the bank credit supply effects of monetary
policy is also complicated by the net worth effects of monetary policy. The complication arises
because net worth effects cause the volume of bank lending to be determined by bank credit
supply side effects and bank credit demand side effects. The supply side effects are at the
core of the credit channel theory of monetary policy transmission which links the bank lending
decisions of banks to the net worth position of firms. In response to a monetary contraction,
the credit channel theory predicts an unambiguous decline in bank credit supply given the
deterioration in the balance sheet position of potential borrowers such as firms (cf. Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989).3 In contrast to bank credit supply, a monetary policy induced decline in net
worth has an ambiguous effect on bank credit demand: it may expand or contract. On the one
hand, firms may demand more bank credit in response to lower net worth in order to be able
to finance fixed and inventory investment and to preserve liquidity. On the other hand, firms
may not change or even reduce bank credit demand in the wake of monetary contraction. This
reaction requires firms to be swift in adjusting production to the interest rate induced decline
in output demand so as to reduce variable costs of production and to avoid the costs associated
with undesired inventory accumulation. In addition, bank credit demand may decline when
firms delay physical capital investment in anticipation of lower future interest rates.
Overall, the net worth effect of monetary policy causes bank credit supply to contract, while
bank credit demand may expand or contract. Unfortunately, we cannot identify the net worth
effects on bank credit supply or bank credit demand. However, we do not expect that this
shortcoming affects our conclusions regarding the bank supply effects of monetary policy. This
is because existing evidence tends to lend no or weak support to the existence of balance sheet
effects of monetary policy in Germany. Evidence against the existence of net worth effects
is provided by Siegfried (2000), Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), and Chatelain et al.
(2003), and Arnold and Vrugt (2004). Von Kalckreuth (2001) finds support for the existence
of balance sheet effects.4 However, the net worth effect of monetary policy is small and
attributable to firm creditworthiness rather than to firm size. The relative unimportance of
firm size effects is attributed to the strength of housebank relationships which causes the
relationship between firm size and financial constraints to be weak.
3Also see Trautwein (2000) for a literature review on the balance sheet effects of monetary policy and on
the relationship between firms’ net worth and access to bank credit.
4Deutsche Bundesbank (2002b) summarizes and interprets the results.
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Existing studies on the bank lending effects of monetary policy build on the assumption that
bank credit demand does not differ between debtors in general and industries in particu-
lar. They approximate credit demand with macroeconomic aggregates such as real economic
output and estimate bank lending functions for the aggregate economy.5 Although the macro-
economic data are useful since they are available for long time periods at relatively high
frequencies, the underlying models only illustrate the bank lending effects of credit demand
changes for the average industry. Differences in credit demand across industries are ignored.
In addition, macroeconomic data do not control for possible cross-industry differences in the
response of bank lending to monetary policy changes. The effectiveness of monetary policy
is, thus, considered to be independent of the industry structure of the loan portfolio of banks.
Furthermore, most studies do not consider possible cross-banking group differences in the re-
sponse of bank lending to changes in bank credit demand or monetary policy. Instead, they
typically provide evidence for an aggregate measure of all banks, disregarding cross-banking
group effects.6
In our view, however, knowledge regarding the industry effects and banking group effects of
bank lending is important as the results illustrate whether the effectiveness of monetary policy
depends on the institutional setting of the banking system and on the industry composition of
bank credit portfolios. Besides, an understanding of banking group effects allows for inferences
as to the influence of banking sector consolidation on the likely impact of future monetary
policy on bank lending. The identification of industry effects is also important because they
influence the allocation of bank credit between industries and, hence, the availability of bank
credit to industries. Since German banks are not restricted in the maximum share of credit
they can grant to a particular industry7, industry effects may cause firms in some industries
to be credit constraint even in absence of credit market imperfections.
The present paper is motivated by these considerations. We do not impose the assumption
of homogenous bank credit demand and use the industry dimension of bank lending data to
identify the bank lending effects of changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy in
Germany. In addition, we explicitly allow for cross-banking group differences in bank lending
functions to capture structural banking group dissimilarities in terms of customer base which
may impede on the homogeneity assumption. To this end, we do not only compile evidence for
the aggregate of banking groups, but also for the savings banking group and for the sub-groups
of the credit cooperative banking sector. We hypothesize that industries and banking groups
determine the response of bank lending to changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy.
In particular, we argue that changes in bank lending are industry specific and that the industry
composition of a bank’s loan portfolio determines the effectiveness of monetary policy through
credit channel effects.
We discuss two questions. Firstly, are changes in the industry-specific volume of bank credit
explained by bank lending effects of monetary policy or do they reflect changes in industry-
5See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank (2002c), De Bondt (1998), Kakes and Sturm (2002), Ehrmann
et al. (2003), Worms (2003), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Hu¨lsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004).
6The notable exception is Ku¨ppers (2001) and Kakes and Sturm (2002) who distinguish banking groups in
empirical studies for Germany.
7Limits only prevail with respect to the maximum exposure to a single debtor.
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specific bank credit demand?8 Secondly, does the sensitivity of bank lending to changes in
monetary policy or loan demand differ across industries or across banking groups? The answer
to these questions will show that industry bank lending responds much more to changes in
industry bank credit demand than to monetary policy changes. Our results lend very strong
support to the existence of industry effects of bank lending, whereas banking group effects
are comparatively weak. Furthermore, evidence in favor of credit channel effects of monetary
policy crucially depends on the choice of industry and banking group. In view of these findings,
we conclude that empirical studies which do not control for the industry structure of bank
lending provide an incomplete view on the bank lending effects of bank credit demand and
monetary policy. The underlying results only reflect the influence of the average industry.
However, neglecting banking group effects is unlikely to affect the overall conclusions as to
the determinants of bank lending.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing evidence on the credit
channel effects of monetary policy via bank lending in Germany. Section 3 describes the
German banking industry. Within this framework, the discussion stresses the balance sheet
structure of the main banking groups and the industry structure of the corresponding loan
portfolios. Furthermore, we ask whether bank lending is sensitive to the existence of structural
differences between East- and West-Germany. Section 4 discusses the empirical model and
the empirical estimation strategy and section 5 presents the data and describes the outlier
adjustment method. Section 6 reports the empirical results from dynamic panel estimations
and robustness checks. We will ask whether differences in the response of bank lending
to changes in industry output, industry prices, and monetary policy are explained by effects
associated with banking groups or industries. We conclude in section 7.
2 The Credit Channel Effects of Monetary Policy in Germany
There is a wide range of studies on the bank lending effects of monetary policy in Europe.
Because individual firm and bank level data are only available to a small extent, the empirical
investigations largely rely on aggregate data. The studies differ in terms of the geographical
scope of the analysis, the empirical approach, and the variables used to characterize banks.
Furthermore, dissimilarities prevail as to the dimension of the data. Many studies on the
credit channel effects of monetary policy ignore the micro structure of the bank credit market
and employ highly aggregated loan variables. The corresponding evidence differs in terms
of conclusions as to the operation of a credit channel in Europe in general and Germany in
particular. As regards the aggregate evidence for Germany, Holtemo¨ller (2003), Hu¨lsewig,
Winker, and Worms (2004), Hu¨lsewig, Mayer, and Wollmersha¨user (2005) report evidence
which is consistent with credit channel effects of bank lending, while Guender and Moersch
(1997) report unambiguous evidence against bank lending effects of monetary policy. Garretsen
and Swank (1998) find weak support for the transmission of monetary policy changes through
bank lending effects in the Netherlands. Banks are found to immediately reduce bond holdings
8We cannot control for the response of bank lending to monetary policy induced changes in credit demand.
However, to the extent that monetary policy changes affect industry output or industry price only with a lag,
changes in the volume of bank loans can still predominantly be attributed to changes in bank credit demand.
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instead of lending in response to a restrictive monetary policy change.
The evidence from studies using aggregate data can be criticized for providing an incomplete
view on the bank lending effects of monetary policy. This is because the evidence from
aggregate data only captures the net effect of the interest rate reaction of the components
of bank lending. Studies which use disaggregated lending data to distinguish bank lending
by its components demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to the type of bank loan and to
the choice of banking group. Kakes, Sturm and Maier (2001) and Kakes and Sturm (2002)
employ disaggregated data on short-, medium-, and long-term lending to households and
firms and aggregate lending data by banking groups to test for a credit channel in Germany,
respectively. Kakes, Sturm and Maier (2001) report evidence against bank lending effects of
monetary policy in Germany. Lending to most loan categories is found to expand rather than to
contract in response to a monetary contraction. Kakes and Sturm (2002) report weak evidence
supporting the credit channel effects via bank lending in Germany. They find that bank lending
effects of monetary policy only exist for the credit cooperative banking group, but not for the
commercial or savings banking group. The discrepancy in the result for credit cooperatives and
savings banks is interesting since both banking groups operate under comparable institutional
setups and serve comparable customers. Ku¨ppers (2001) identifies the credit channel effects
of monetary policy in Germany for a sample of heterogeneous banks. He reports significant
bank size effects of monetary policy. However, inconsistent with the credit channel theory, size
effects originate with big banks rather than with savings banks or credit cooperatives.
In an international context, Dale and Haldane (1995) use data on corporate and household
lending to assess the bank lending effects of monetary policy for the United Kingdom and report
evidence in favor of a credit channel through household bank lending. Barran, Coudert, and
Mojon (1997) distinguish corporate, household, and housing real estate lending in Germany
and France. Regardless of the borrower type, the evidence is inconsistent with a bank lending
channel of monetary policy transmission. Finally, De Haan (2003) investigates the credit
channel effects of monetary policy for the Netherlands and distinguishes between short- and
long-term loans with and without state guarantees and bank credit to households and firms
with and without state guarantees. The corresponding results indicate that bank lending
effects of monetary policy only arise for unsecured bank credit in the Netherlands and that
bank lending effects are weaker for households than for firms and weaker for short- than for
long-term lending.
While studies using disaggregated data allow for more detail on the determinants of bank
lending, they still provide an incomplete view since they identify the bank lending effects of
monetary policy by means of separate samples. For example, Kakes and Sturm (2002) capture
differences in bank size by estimating models for different banking groups which differ in terms
of business volume. In contrast to macro-studies, micro-studies exploit heterogeneities within
samples to identify the bank credit demand and the bank credit supply effects of monetary
policy. The remainder of this section reviews the micro-studies on European countries. Given
the focus of the present project, we only discuss studies which contain Germany.9 Micro-
studies for European countries including Germany are reported by De Bondt (1998), Favero,
9See Angeloni, Kashyp, and Mojon (2003) for a compilation of micro studies which document the credit
channel effects of monetary policy in European countries.
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Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999), Altunbas¸, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002), Ehrmann et al. (2003),
and Worms (2003). Using data from BankScope, De Bondt (1998) reports panel econometric
evidence in support of a bank lending effect of monetary policy for Germany. The bank
lending effect is strong in comparison to other European countries and larger for small and
less liquid banks. Even though Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) use the same database,
the cross-section analysis does not yield evidence of a bank lending effect in Germany. In fact,
small banks are found to increase credit supply in response to monetary policy shocks. Also
using BankScope data, Altunbas¸, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002) employ a panel estimation
framework to provide evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of bank lending in European
countries. In line with Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999), the results do not point to the
operation of a credit channel in Germany.
Ehrmann et al. (2003) question the usefulness of the BankScope database given its well-known
large sample bias. They test for the existence of a bank lending effect of monetary policy by
using micro data compiled by national central banks. Ehrmann et al. (2003) empirically
account for the identification problem of loan demand and loan supply effects by estimating
dynamic panel models using bank-specific bank size, liquidity, and capitalization as loan supply
proxy variables and macroeconomic measures of economic activity as loan demand variables.
The evidence points to the transmission of monetary policy shocks through bank lending.
However, cross-bank differences in the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy changes
are only attributable to differences in liquidity and not to dissimilarities in asset size and
capitalization. As regards loan demand factors, bank lending is found to respond to inflation,
but not to output growth.
Worms (2003) presents a study closely related in terms of structure to that of Ehrmann et al.
(2003). In line with the earlier study, Worms (2003) uses bank liquidity and bank capitalization
next to bank size to test for the operation of a credit channel in Germany. Using a dynamic
panel estimation methodology, the evidence largely confirms the results by Ehrmann et al.
(2003). Bank lending is found to be more sensitive to changes in monetary policy, the less
liquid and capitalized a bank is. Bank size per se only captures cross-bank differences in the
bank lending effects of monetary policy when the analysis controls for short-term interbank
deposits. Interestingly, the results strengthen if the smallest banks are excluded from the
analysis. Worms (2003) attributes this result to the pronounced dependence of small banks on
interbank liquidity. Very small banks are argued to hold more short-term interbank deposits to
avoid discontinuous and accelerated shifts in their loan portfolio in general and in their lending
to private debtors in particular. In that respect, short-term interbank deposits are seen as
means to maintain close housebank relationships with bank customers especially in presence
of adverse monetary policy shocks.
To summarize, existing studies report ambiguous results regarding the bank lending effects of
monetary policy. The ambiguity prevails for micro as well as for macro analyses. Furthermore,
existing empirical studies differ in the cross-sectional dimensions of the estimations. Some
studies only exploit a single data dimension and divide the banking sample by either bank
size, bank liquidity, or bank capitalization. Other studies also split the sample along a second
dimension, using the maturity of bank credit, the banking group, or the group of debtors
as additional model criterion. Among the existing studies, only Worms (2003) controls for
a possible industry bias in bank lending. However, he models the interdependence between
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loan supply and industry indirectly by including a weighted average of real sector output in the
panel estimation. The resulting estimates do not allow for inferences as to the industry-specific
effects of bank lending.
3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview
In order to provide the framework for the subsequent discussion, this section describes the
German banking system.10 We are specifically interested in the balance sheet structure of the
main banking groups and in the industry structure of the credit portfolio. The distribution
of bank credit to industries and the underlying maturity structure of loans is of particular
interest. The data are obtained from the monthly bank balance sheet statistics and the
quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Section 5 describes the data in
detail.
3.1 The Structure of the German Banking Sector
The financing system in Germany is a bank-based system, with banks being the most important
source of external finance. The banking system can be divided into two main categories: uni-
versal banks and specialized banks. At the end of 2003, the German banking sector consisted
of 2,466 banks of which 2,255 were universal and 211 were special. The German banking sys-
tem is, hence, a universal banking system. Given this property, the present analysis disregards
specialized banks and focuses on the three main universal banking groups, i.e., the savings,
cooperative, and commercial banking sector.
Each of the main banking groups can be divided into two tiers. The first tier consists of
few large head institutions which are the Land banks, cooperative central banks, and the
big banks for the savings, credit cooperative, and commercial banking sector, respectively.
The second tier is composed of many primary institutions: local savings banks in the savings
banking sector, credit cooperatives in the cooperative banking sector, and regional and private
banks in the commercial banking sector. Commercial banks and the head institutions of the
savings and credit cooperative sector operate product portfolios which differ from those of the
primary savings and credit cooperative banks. The head institutions of the savings and credit
cooperative banking sector are the central bank to the corresponding local banks and offer
universal banking services to larger foreign and domestic banks and non-bank customers (cf.
Hackethal, 2004). Particular to the head institutions of the savings banking group is their role
in providing services to the government of the state in which they are located. Considering
commercial banks, they structure their product portfolio around investment and wholesale
banking activities, predominantly serving large rather than small- and medium-sized clients.
Table1 reports summary statistics for the head and primary institutions regarding the distrib-
ution of total assets, bank capitalization, liquidity, short-term interbank claims, and non-bank
10See Hackethal (2004) for an extensive discussion of the properties of the German banking sector.
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lending.11 As is evident for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4, the structural differences be-
tween head and primary institutions are reflected in the descriptive statistics of balance sheet
variables. Primary institutions are on average better capitalized than their respective head in-
stitutions even though they are smaller. Besides, local savings banks and regional and private
commercial banks tend to be more liquid than Land banks and big banks, while the primary
institutions of the cooperative banking sector are on average less liquid than their central insti-
tutions. Regardless of the banking group, a comparatively large share of liquidity is accounted
for by short-term interbank claims. With the exception of regional and private commercial
banks, primary institutions hold a larger share of interbank claims than their respective head
institutions.
-Insert Table 1 here-
Considering the distribution of lending to non-banks12, the primary institutions in each banking
sector lend on average more to non-banks than the respective head institutions. The differ-
ence is particularly pronounced for the credit cooperative sector: lending by central institutes
accounts on average for 17 percent of total assets, while the corresponding number for credit
cooperatives is 60 percent. The central institutions’ low involvement in non-bank lending is
attributable to their main role as central bank to primary credit cooperatives. In this function
they act as clearing institutions for interbank transfers between credit cooperatives and assist
primary credit cooperatives in accessing financial markets and in serving their customers.13
As regards the share of industry bank credit to non-bank credit, primary and head institutions
of the commercial or savings banking group do not differ in the degree of industry lending. A
comparatively large share of aggregate non-bank lending is allocated towards industries (i.e.,
businesses and self-employed), exceeding 50 percent and 40 percent of total non-bank lending
for the commercial and savings banking group, respectively. Pronounced differences again
prevail between the primary and head institutions of the credit cooperative sector: industry
lending by central credit institutes and primary credit cooperatives accounts on average for
approximately two-third and four-ninth of total non-bank lending, respectively. Considering
the share of short-term lending to total lending, we find considerable differences between head
and primary institutions for all banking groups. Except for the credit cooperative sector, head
institutions on average provide less short-term finance than primary banks.
The entries in Table 1 also demonstrate that there are not only differences in the balance sheet
structure within each banking group, but also between banking groups. These differences are
expected to affect the conclusions regarding the bank lending effects of monetary policy for
11As regards local savings banks, the descriptive statistics refer to public savings banks only. Private savings
banks are excluded throughout this paper since they operate under a different institutional setup. The existence
of significant differences in the balance sheet structure of public and private savings banks is confirmed by
the test statistics of one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for almost all sampled balance sheet items. The
ANOVA test statistics are available on request.
12Non-bank lending involves bank credit supply to domestic businesses, private households, government,
and foreign non-banks.
13Also see Hackethal (2004).
9
individual banking groups. For example, banks belonging to banking groups with a relatively
large amount of liquid assets (group j) might be better able to insulate their lending activities
from monetary policy changes than banks in banking groups with only few liquid assets (group
l). If this holds, cross-bank differences in liquidity might be a less important source of bank
lending effects of monetary policy in group j than in group l. This, in turn, suggests that
banking group differences in liquidity may affect conclusions regarding the strength of the
bank lending effects of monetary policy.
To conserve on space, we confine the comparison to the primary institutions of the banking
groups which constitute the focal point of the empirical analysis. As is evident from Table 1,
the largest and most liquid banks operate in the savings banking sector, while the smallest and
least liquid banks belong to the group of credit cooperatives. The regional and private banks
in the commercial banking sector report the largest share of bank capital, exceeding that of
savings and cooperative banks by more than 90 and 60 percent, respectively. The descriptive
analysis also shows that each banking group reports a high share of non-bank lending to total
assets. Whereas the primary institutions of the credit cooperative and savings banking sector
report on average comparable shares of non-bank lending to total assets, the corresponding
share tends to be lower for the commercial banking group. This reflect the greater involvement
of commercial banks in lending to banks.14
However, when looking at the share of total industry lending to non-bank lending, the primary
institutions of the commercial banking sector lend on average more to industries than savings
banks and credit cooperatives. The descriptive evidence suggests that the difference in the
average share of total industry lending reflects considerable differences in the role of banking
groups as source of short-term finance to industries. Regional and private commercial banks
tend to be more heavily engaged in short-term finance than credit cooperatives or savings
banks. In fact, short-term lending to industry i as share of total industry lending is approx-
imately twice as large for commercial banks than for credit cooperatives and savings banks.
The apparent weakness of savings banks and credit cooperatives in short-term finance is at-
tributable to their practice of confining business to local areas. Superior knowledge of local
market conditions facilitates assessments regarding the long-term creditworthiness of debtors
which yields a comparative advantage in long-term lending.
In order to ascertain the statistical significance of cross-banking group differences in the balance
sheet structure, we analyze the variance properties of the bank characteristics by means of
a one-way analysis of variance. Table 2 reports the ANOVA test statistics for asset size,
liquidity, capitalization, short-term interbank claims, and the volume of bank credit. Panel
A contains the results for the three main banking groups, i.e., commercial, savings, and
credit cooperative banks and panel B summarizes the evidence for six sub-groups of the credit
cooperative banking group. Using the classification scheme of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
the credit cooperative sub-groups are commercial cooperatives, rural cooperatives, Raiffeisen
banks, Sparda banks, PSD banks (Post-, Spar-und Darlehensvereine), and civil servants banks.
We deem this distinction necessary to control for banking group differences in the balance sheet
structure and for differences in the type of customer.
14For 1992:1-2002:4, the share of bank lending to total assets was on average equal to 34 percent, 13
percent, and 8 percent for commercial, credit cooperative, and savings banks, respectively.
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-Insert Table 2 here-
A comparison of the mean squared values in Table 2 illustrates that the hypothesis of equal
means can be rejected for all bank characteristics and for each banking group sample. The
evidence, thus, points to statistically significant differences in the balance sheet structure of
banking groups. This, in turn, suggests that conclusions regarding the bank lending effects
of monetary policy changes are sensitive to the choice of banking group. To control for
this possibility, we will therefore estimate industry-specific bank lending functions by explicitly
allowing for individual ’sub-group’ effects.
3.2 The Industry Structure of Bank Loan Portfolios
So far, the description of the structure of the German banking sector is confined to the
distribution of lending to the grand total of industries. This section extends the analysis in
that it stresses the industry structure of bank credit portfolios. Table 3 reports lending to
industry i in total lending by banking group for eight industries at the one-digit industry level
(main industries) and for nine industries at the two-digit industry level (manufacturing sub-
groups). Given the focus of the present paper, we only stress the distribution of aggregate and
short-term lending as provided by commercial banks (big banks, regional, and private banks)
and by the primary institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking group.
-Insert Table 3 here-
The statistics in Table 3 point to cross-industry differences in the distribution of bank credit.
Banks predominantly lend to industries which account for the largest share of output in the
aggregate economy: the service, wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing industry. Co-
operative, savings, and commercial banks hold on average, respectively, 69 percent, 81 percent,
and 89 percent of their bank loan portfolio with these sectors. Approximately half of these
shares is accounted for by lending to the service sector as the most important recipient of bank
credit.
As regards the remaining main industries, the volume of bank credit tends to be more evenly
distributed across sectors. Agriculture and construction primarily obtain bank finance from the
credit cooperative banking group, with rural credit cooperatives and Raiffeisen banks being the
primary source of bank finance.15 The importance of credit cooperatives for agriculture and
construction reflects the regional character of (i) credit cooperatives and (ii) agricultural and
constructing firms: lenders and borrowers confine their activities to a particular local area. In
15Raiffeisen banks and rural credit cooperatives grant 26 (19) percent and 16 (12) percent of aggregate
(short-term) credit to agriculture, respectively. In comparison, the corresponding number for commercial credit
cooperatives is 6 (5) percent. For construction, the cross-banking group differences are less pronounced.
Raiffeisen banks and rural credit cooperatives hold 14 (19) percent and 12 (16) percent of aggregate (short-
term) loans with construction, respectively. Commercial credit cooperatives grant 12 (15) percent of bank
credit to construction.
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adopting a regional focus, credit cooperatives have superior knowledge of local market condi-
tions which facilitates assessments regarding local economic prospects and the creditworthiness
of potential debtors.
The share of bank credit is on average smallest for the finance and insurance industry. One
possible explanation for this relationship are large operating surpluses in the finance sector
which reduce the need for external finance in general and bank finance in particular.16 Next to
the finance industry, the energy sector also receives comparatively little credit from commercial
banks and from the primary institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking group.
Although not reported in Table 3, the Land banks are an important source of finance to the
energy sector. For the period 1992-2002, 12 percent of total lending by Land banks was
directed towards the energy sector, with short- and long-term bank credit accounting for 28
and 60 percent, respectively. The importance of Land banks as source of long-term finance
to the energy sector is attributable to the components of this sector: mining and quarrying;
electricity, gas, and water supply. Given the importance of each of these sub-sectors for the
functioning of the economy, general interest is with the maintenance and improvement of the
underlying infrastructures. Maintenance requires large fixed expenditures, while infrastructure
investment involves costs which tend to be sunk. In order to encourage investment, Land
banks grant favorable access to especially long-term finance even though investment per se
might not be profitable.
Turning to the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, lending to each of the sectors only
accounts for a small share of total bank credit. Again, the share of bank credit to each sector is
positively related to its size in the aggregate economy. Furthermore, lending to manufacturing
sub-sectors tends to be unevenly distributed. The share of bank credit is comparatively small for
the coke and chemicals, rubber and plastic, and non-metallic mineral goods producing sector.
However, it is relatively large for the wood and paper, machinery and transport equipment,
food, and metals producing sector. In fact, lending to these sectors is of approximately the
same magnitude as lending to the finance and transport sector.
3.3 What Explains Differences in Bank Lending?
As stated, the present paper determines whether changes in bank lending can be explained by
industry effects and/or banking group effects. In order to gain a first understanding as to the
relative importance of banking groups and industries as source of variation in the distribution
of loans across industries, we compute two-way ANOVA test statistics. Table 4 reports the
results of the analysis of variance which is defined for the null hypothesis that the volume
of bank credit does not differ across either banking groups or industries. We compute the
test statistics for the main banking groups and for the sub-sectors of the credit cooperative
banking group. Furthermore, we report evidence for industry samples with and without the
sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry.
16For the time period 1992-2002, the share of operating surplus to value added amounts to 51 percent
with a standard deviation of 2.30 percent (own computation using the OECD’s STAN database for Industrial
Analysis). In comparison, operating surplus accounts for at most 31 percent of value added for the remaining
industries.
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-Insert Table 4 here-
The evidence indicates that the null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the level
of the industry and the banking group. That is, industry-specific bank lending differs across
industries as well as across banking groups. This result holds for aggregate and short-term
bank credit and for the main banking groups and the sub-sectors of the cooperative banking
group. Even though the volume of bank credit differs across industries as well as across
banking groups, industries are the more important source of variation. This is suggested by
the F-value for the industry effect which is much larger than the corresponding value for the
banking group effect. These findings point to cross-industry heterogeneities in bank credit
demand which are likely to be determined by structural and cyclical industry characteristics.
Besides industry-specific structural factors, bank lending might also be influenced by regional
factors. This section concludes by testing for regional effects in bank lending. Savings banks,
credit cooperatives, and small commercial banks confine their business to narrow local areas.
Cooperatives and small commercial banks are locally constrained by sheer size, whereas savings
banks are prohibited from crossing local borders by the principle of regional demarcation.
Because the industry structure differs at the level of German states (Bundesla¨nder) and at
the regional level for East- and West-Germany, the regional focus in banking may also explain
cross-bank differences in the industry composition of credit portfolios.
In order to determine the relative importance of regions and banking groups as source of differ-
ences in the industry structure of bank credit, two-way ANOVA test statistics are constructed
for the hypothesis that bank lending is the same across regions and banking groups. Table
5 contains the results for East- and West-Germany and for the three main banking groups.
The evidence for the German states and for the sub-groups of the credit cooperative banking
sector is not reported because the results do not differ qualitatively from those for East- and
West-Germany or for the main banking groups. Furthermore, because the results tend to be
robust across industries, we only report the evidence for composites of industries and not for
each individual sector.17
-Insert Table 5 here-
The entries in Table 5 point to the existence of discernible cross-banking group and cross-
region dissimilarities in bank lending. Even though differences in bank lending are attributable
to both banking groups and regions, the banking group effect dominates the regional effect.
This conclusion arises from the observation that the F-value for the banking group effect
is much larger than the F-value for the regional effect. Regional factors, hence, appear to
be a less important determinant of bank lending, while banking-group-specific factors clearly
matter.
17See the notes to Table 5 for the definition of the industry samples.
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3.4 Industry Determinants of Bank Lending
Motivated by the importance of industry effects as source of industry bank lending, this section
discusses possible determinants of industry-specific bank lending related to structural properties
of industries. Industry-specific cyclical determinants of bank lending will be discussed in section
6.18 We identify possible structural determinants of bank lending by determining the degree
of correlation between the share of bank credit to industry i and either industry size, firm size
distribution, openness to trade, a measure of internal funds of finance, and proxy variables of
capital intensity. In order to avoid that the correlation coefficients are confounded by scale
effects, the degree of correlation is determined for the ratio of lending to industry i over lending
to the grand total of industries.
Considering industry size, we test whether the relative importance of industries in an economy
affects the industry composition of a bank’s loan portfolio. For absolute measures of industry
size and bank credit volume, the relationship between industry size and bank credit volume
is unambiguously positive: banks grant more credit to large rather than small industries. For
relative measures of industry size, the relationship may go in either direction. On the one
hand, industries which are large relative to the aggregate may obtain comparatively more bank
credit. This relationship is likely to hold for young and growing industries whose promising
growth prospects are associated with profitable investment projects. Because entrepreneurial
industries lack internal funds of finance in presence of investment opportunities, the share of
lending to these industries is likely to be higher in comparison to mature and well-established
industries. On the other hand, relatively large industries may receive a comparatively small
share of bank lending. This relationship is likely to apply to mature or declining industries whose
financing needs are largely covered by internal funds of finance or whose external financing
needs are low because of poor investment opportunities. In the present paper, our relative
measure of industry size is the ratio of value added of industry i to value added of the grand
total of industries.
Capital intensity is included to control for the view that the need for external finance increases
with the capital intensity of production. External financial funds are required to meet the
costs associated with replacing depreciated capital, adjusting existing capital, or installing new
capital. The costs of finance are, hereby, heavily dependent on the monetary policy stance
through its effect on the opportunity cost of capital investment. This link is emphasized
by the interest rate channel of monetary policy.19 Because the strength of the interest rate
effects depends on industry structure, the interest rate channel is also known as the industry
channel.20 The literature on industry effects of monetary policy favors several measures of
capital intensity.21 We use industry-specific capital intensity measures which appear to be
time-invariant and, hence, robust to cyclical fluctuations: the ratio of the capital stock to
employment (K/N)i and the ratio of employment to real value added (N/Y)i in industry i.
22
18We only report the results for structural characteristics because data limitations in terms of frequency
prevent us from using the data in the dynamic panel estimation.
19See, e.g., Kashyap and Stein (1995), Mojon (2000), and Kuttner and Mosser (2002).
20See, e.g., Dedola and Lippi (2005), Peersman and Smets (2005).
21See Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000), Peersman and Smets (2005), and Dedola and Lippi (2005).
22We also use the ratio of the stock of capital over output as proxy variable of capital intensity. Because
the results are qualitatively the same as those for the ratio of the stock of capital over employment, we do
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We include firm size to test for a possible inverse relationship between firm size and the need
for bank finance. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) uses bank finance needs as synonym for
bank dependence and explains the negative relationship between the demand for bank finance
and firm size by stressing the transaction costs and information asymmetries associated with
bond-based financing. Transaction costs such as brokerage and underwriting fees are largely
independent of the amount of bonds issued and, thus, render only large amounts of bond issues
feasible from a financial point of view. Information asymmetries arise between the issuer and
potential holder of bonds. In order to mitigate asymmetric information problems, sufficient
information on the bond issuing company needs to be easily available. Because large firms
are subject to more stringent regulation, disclosure rules, and reporting standards than small
firms, such information is more freely disseminated for large than for small companies and the
degree of information asymmetries, hence, decreases with the size of firms. As a consequence,
the ability to substitute bank lending by bonds increases with firm size and the degree of bank
dependence diminishes with firm size.23 These relationships cause business size to be typically
associated with the credit channel of monetary policy.
In Germany, the difference in the relative importance of bonds and bank credit also rests on
relationship banking and the corresponding notion of banks being the housebank to firms.
The housebank principle facilitates the flow of information between creditors and debtors,
establishes confidence, and reduces asymmetric information problems. Tight bank-firm rela-
tionships, thus, leave banks with a comparative advantage regarding risk assessment, moni-
toring, and information asymmetries and lower the costs of bank-finance relative to nonbank
finance.24 In view of these relationships, we hypothesize that banks lend more to industries
with a large share of small firms. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the share of small
firms in industry i to approximate the distribution of firm size.
Besides firm size distribution, we approximate the need for external finance by including the
industry-specific ratio of operating surplus over value added as proxy variable of internal funds
of finance or working capital.25 Credit market imperfections cause the expected relationship
between internal funds of finance and bank credit to be negative. The underlying argument
is similar to that of the net worth effect in section 1 and predicts a mismatch between credit
demand and credit supply.
Finally, we include openness to trade in order to determine the extent to which industry-specific
exposure to trade and exchange rate fluctuations affects loan demand. Whether lending by
banks to industries open to trade responds more or less to changes in industry production
and industry price depends on the argumentation. On the one hand, open industries may not
not report the corresponding evidence.
23Also see Deutsche Bundesbank (1998a, 2002a) and Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for a discussion of the bank
dependence of small- and medium-sized companies.
24See Harhoff and Ko¨rting (1998) for empirical evidence which lends support to the importance of housebank
relations and relationship lending in Germany. The underlying analysis does not distinguish between the size
of banks and firms involved in a long-term relationship.
25An alternative and more direct measure of internal finance is cash flows. However, because industry-
specific information on cash flow or the components thereof (earnings, interest payments, taxes, dividend
payments, depreciation) are unavailable, we use operating surplus as simple measure.
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adjust loan demand in response to output growth or inflation by as much as closed industries if
cyclical changes in product demand abroad and at home are not synchronous but occurring at
a periodic lag. This smoothes cash flows, and, therefore, the cyclical demand for bank credit.
On the other hand, lending to open industries might be more sensitive to changes in domestic
output and inflation when domestic and foreign business cycles are dis-concordant and when
real exchange rate developments cause adverse developments in international competitiveness.
Table 6 reports the degree of correlation between short-term lending and structural industry
characteristics for the period 1992-2002.26 The results for aggregate lending are not reported
because they do not differ qualitatively from those for short-term lending. In order to match
the frequency of bank-specific and industry-specific data, the quarterly bank level data are
expressed in annual terms. Furthermore, we aggregate the micro data over all banks in order
to avoid that the significance properties of the correlation coefficients are driven by the number
of observations. The correlation coefficients build on information for seven industries at the
one-digit industry level and nine sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. We obtain the data
on industry characteristics from the New Cronos database of Eurostat and from the STAN
database for Industrial Analysis of the OECD.27 The firm size data refer to the size class of
1 to 19 employees; a size category which corresponds to the definition of small firm size (cf.
Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991; Henrekson and Johansson, 1999). The bank lending data
are obtained from the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.28 The degree
of correlation between industry characteristics and bank lending is computed for the variables’
ratio of industry i to the grand total of industries for the aggregate banking group, the sub-
groups of the credit cooperative banking sector, and for commercial and savings banks.29
-Insert Table 6 here-
The evidence suggests that banks grant relatively more credit to industries which are compar-
atively large. This suggests that the credit portfolio of banks is biased towards large industries
when measured in absolute as well as relative terms. For Germany, the relationship between
relative industry size and the share of bank lending might be influenced by the service industry
which accounts for the largest share of value added and bank lending. However, when we
exclude this sector, the linkage between the share of bank lending and relative industry size
even strengthens.30 That is, relatively large industries obtain a larger share of bank credit
beyond the effect associated with the service industry.
Considering the relationship between the relative degree of capital intensity of industry produc-
tion and the share of bank credit, banks lend comparatively less to capital intensive industries.
26Because of data availability constraints, the firm size correlation coefficients are constructed for the period
1999-2000.
27See appendix A.1 for details.
28Section 5 provides additional details.
29The results are robust to the definition of industry characteristics. Expressing the industry characteristics
in absolute rather than in relative terms does not affect the conclusions.
30The results are not reported but available on request. The correlation coefficients for the remaining
industry characteristics tend to be robust to the exclusion of the service sector.
16
This finding is robust to the choice of capital intensity measure and is particularly strong for
the sub-groups of the credit cooperative sector. The negative link between relative capital
intensity and the relative share of bank lending is counterintuitive if one considers the costs of
physical capital investment which asks for financial means. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1996)
suggests that the inverse relationship between the volume of bank lending and capital intensity
is due to precautionary lending on the part of banks to capital intensive industries. Precaution
arises because lending to capital intensive industries is considered to be characterized by higher
probabilities of loan losses than lending to capital extensive industries.
As regards the evidence for firm size, the correlation coefficients have the expected positive
sign which points to an inverse relationship between firm size and the share of bank credit.
According to the European Commission (2003), this reflects the greater need of relatively small
firms for working capital.31 Unfortunately, the correlation coefficient is statistically insignificant
which leaves the relationship indicative rather than affirmative. We attribute the insignificance
to the small number of data points on firm size. Next to firm size, the correlation coefficients
for operating surplus and openness also tend to be insignificant. The exception concerns
lending by Raiffeisen banks which grant relatively more credit to open industries and lending
by commercial banks which grant less credit to industries with relatively high operating surplus.
However, the low significance properties again cause this relationship to be suggestive.
Overall, the correlation coefficients provide ambiguous evidence as to the existence of a rela-
tionship between structural industry characteristics and the share of bank credit to individual
industries. Significant relationships are confined to relative industry size and to the proxy vari-
ables of relative capital intensity. Alternative industry characteristics do not have a significant
effect on the industry composition of a bank’s credit portfolio. We will show in section 6
that industry effects of bank lending arise from cyclical factors related to industry output and
industry prices.
3.5 Synthesis
Summarizing, the descriptive analysis shows that banks structure their credit portfolio around
industries and that banking groups differ in their exposure to industries. The differences
are mainly attributable to effects associated with banking groups and industries, but less to
regional effects. In view of these findings, differences in the responsiveness of lending to
changes in loan demand and monetary policy are, therefore, expected to reflect banking group
effects and industry effects. Given the evidence from section 3.1 and 3.2, the banking-group
effects are likely to reflect cross-banking group heterogeneities in the industry structure of bank
credit portfolios and in the characteristics of the average bank. Cross-industry differences in
the relative share of bank lending are attributable to cross-industry differences in structural
characteristics like capital intensity and relative industry size, but not to firm size distribution.
31The descriptive evidence in European Commission (2003) illustrates that (small) businesses in manufac-
turing, transport and communication, and wholesale require more bank credit than (small) firms in other
sectors.
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4 Empirical Model
The remainder of this paper abstracts from structural industry characteristics and stresses
industry-specific cyclical determinants of bank credit demand as factors which have a strong
effect on bank lending to industries. Besides cyclical credit demand factors, we will also stress
the role of monetary policy as determinant of industry-specific bank lending and test for credit
channel effects of monetary policy via bank lending. We ask whether differences in the bank
lending effects of credit demand and monetary policy are accounted for by industries or by
banking groups. The corresponding evidence will show whether the industry structure of bank
credit portfolios or the structure of the German banking sector influence the effectiveness of
monetary policy and the performance of industries through the availability of industry-specific
bank credit. Furthermore, we test whether conclusions are robust to the choice of aggregate
and short-term bank credit. The remainder of this section presents the industry-specific bank
lending functions that will be used to identify the industry and banking group effects of bank
credit demand and monetary policy. Within this framework, we also discuss the methodological
approach used to estimate the dynamic panel model.
4.1 Empirical Estimation Framework
In order to identify the response of bank lending to changes in bank credit demand and mon-
etary policy, we estimate a set of bank lending functions using the dynamic panel estimation
framework of Ehrmann et al. (2003), Worms (2003), and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).
Although we use the same structural estimation framework, the analysis adds to the existing
work by exploring the industry dimension of bank lending. Equation (1) describes the empirical
bank lending function for industry i and bank b.
∆Lbi,t = αb +
p∑
j=1
βij∆Lbi,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ1j∆rm,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ2,ij∆IPi,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ3,ij∆Pricei,t−j+
γ4Xb,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
γ5jXb,t−1∆rm,t−j + bi,t. (1)
The coefficient αb is a bank-specific intercept which is included to allow for fixed effects
across banks and bi,t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and constant variance, i.e.,
N ∼ (0, σ2). Lbi,t denotes lending by bank b to industry i at time t, with b = 1, . . . ,Nb and
t = 1, . . . ,T. The autoregressive parameters βij are assumed to be the same across banks, but
heterogeneous across industries. Furthermore, they may differ across banking groups. In order
to control for cross-banking group differences, we estimate the model for individual banking
groups.
∆ is the first log-difference operator of variable V defined as ∆ ≡ logVt− logVt−1. With the
exception of the money market interest rate, the first log-difference transformation is applied to
all variables. The money market interest rate enters in first differences. Ehrmann et al. (2003)
motivate the first-difference structure of the empirical model by stressing that the monetary
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policy effect on bank lending is confined to new loans. They, hence, interpret the first log-
difference of bank credit as flow variable and introduce the level of loans as stock variable.
When suggesting this measure of new loans, Ehrmann et al. (2003) fail to recognize that the
first difference is an imperfect measure of new bank loans since it reflects the net effect of
new loan issues and loan repayments. Unfortunately, the present study can only acknowledge
this shortcoming, but cannot resolve it because of data unavailability. As a consequence,
reductions in the volume of loans outstanding may reflect a decline in new loan issues or a net
increase in loan repayments.
IPit approximates industry-specific output at time t which serves as a measure of cyclically
determined industry-specific loan demand. Priceit denotes the industry-specific price at time t
and is included to capture cyclical fluctuations in industry-specific price developments. These
variables do not only determine the external financing needs of industries, but also influence the
perceptions of banks as to the riskiness of industries. Monetary policy actions are represented
by the change in the three-months money market interest rate ∆rm. We assume that the
interest rate is strictly exogenous to bank lending.32 In order to identify the bank lending
effects of monetary policy, the money market interest rate (rm,t−j) at time t-j is interacted
with bank characteristics (Xb,t−1) at time t-1. The vector of bank-specific characteristics Xb
includes asset size (TA), liquidity (A), and capitalization (K) at time t-1. Bank characteristics
are introduced with one lag to avoid an endogeneity bias (cf. Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000;
Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Appendix A.2 contains
a formal definition of the bank characteristics which are normalized with respect to the average
across all banks and time.
Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) show that the tight relationship between the
primary and head institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector causes bank
asset size to be an inappropriate proxy variable of the bank lending effects of monetary policy.
One explanation is that interbank operations enable small banks to shield their loan portfolio
and funding possibilities against monetary policy shocks by providing a relatively unconstrained
access to central bank money. In that sense, the interbank market helps to redistribute liquidity
within the banking sector from banks with excess liquidity to banks in need of liquidity. This,
in turn, moderates financing constraints for small banks. As a consequence, the interest rate
sensitivity of small bank lending does not have to be higher than that of large banks. Bank size
might also be an inappropriate measure of information asymmetries because savings banks as
well as credit cooperatives back their funds with mutual guarantees. This serves to recapitalize
banks and creates a type of insurance scheme for creditors in case of bank insolvency. The
existence of these insurance schemes implies that information asymmetries may not affect
the lending behavior of banks. Size, consequently, appears to be an inadequate variable to
identify the loan supply effects of monetary policy and alternative measures might be bank
capitalization or bank liquidity.
The present model employs two measures of bank liquidity. The first ’broad’ definition com-
putes bank liquidity as the ratio of cash plus securities plus short-term interbank claims over
total bank assets. This measure controls for the extent to which banks have access to in-
32See Worms (2003) for empirical evidence as to the robustness of the interest rate response of bank lending
to the assumption of exogeneity.
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terbank finance. The second ’narrow’ definition of liquidity takes into account the finding
by Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) according to which short-term interbank
claims drive liquidity effects and dwarf asset size effects. We follow Worms (2003) and exclude
short-term interbank claims from the ’narrow’ measure of liquidity. In order to capture the
importance of interbank finance flows, short-term interbank claims also enter the empirical
analysis as an independent variable. In line with the other bank characteristics, interbank
claims are normalized with respect to the average across all banks and time.
We hypothesize the coefficient estimates in model (1) to enter with the following signs. Moti-
vated by the negative effects of higher interest rates on bank reserves, we expect bank lending
to decline in response to a monetary contraction. The distributional effects of monetary policy
are anticipated to be such that the response of bank lending to monetary policy changes is less
pronounced for larger, more liquid, and better capitalized banks. This holds if the coefficient
on the interaction term between each bank characteristic and the interest rate is positive. Am-
bivalent conclusions prevail with respect to the expected effect of industry output growth on
bank lending growth. On the hand, good economic conditions raise the number of investment
projects with positive net present value and, hence, the demand for bank finance. On the
other hand, economic growth stimulates internal cash flows which may lower credit demand.
Because evidence in favor of a negative relationship between output and bank lending is hardly
existing, the long-run coefficient on output growth is expected to be positive.33 Finally, indus-
try inflation is anticipated to stimulate bank lending growth. This relationship is attributable
to the negative effect of positive price changes on real income and, hence, real cash flows.34
The analysis does not explicitly account for merger-driven changes in the German banking
structure and, hence, does not control for the effects of mergers on the individual characteristics
of the merging banks. The appropriateness of this approach is suggested by Worms (2003)
who finds the long-run bank lending effects of monetary policy to be the same for samples
which do not control for mergers and for samples which treat a merged bank as single bank
for the pre- and post-merger sample period. Besides, implementation lags between the time
a merger is officially announced and the time a merger is legally realized makes it difficult to
determine the date of a merger.
4.2 Methodology
The system in equation (1) represents a fixed effects dynamic (unbalanced) panel with large
T and large N. Lagged values of the dependent variable are included to control for omitted
variable and endogeneity bias. Because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the
error term, dynamic panel models are typically not estimated with the static panel fixed effects
estimator. Doing so would introduce a finite sample bias of order 1
T
for N→∞ and fixed T (see
33See De Bondt (1998), Worms (2003), Ehrmann et al. (2003), and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)
for evidence in favor of a positive relationship between bank lending and output. Altunbas¸, Fazylov, and
Molyneux (2002) report a positive output coefficient for medium-sized and undercapitalized banks and a
negative coefficient for small-sized and under- or overcapitalized banks in Germany.
34Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) report evidence of a positive price effect on
bank lending.
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Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). In order to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates, Arellano and
Bond (1991) suggest the use of a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Recent
studies have challenged this method. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell, Bond, and
Windmeijer (2000) have shown that the first-differenced GMM estimates are biased downwards
in the direction of the within-group estimates and Alvarez and Arellano (2003) show that the
GMM estimator is close to the fixed effects estimator for large T. Furthermore, Jung (2005)
illustrates that Arrelano and Bond’s (1991) test of serial residual correlation may build on
inconsistently estimated residuals. Because these are used to decide on the optimal over-
identifying restrictions, coefficient estimates are likely to be inconsistent.
In view of these points and given a comparatively large set of data points in the time dimension,
we estimate the dynamic panel model by using the fixed effects estimator. Besides, the use
of the fixed effects estimator is also motivated by the evidence from the Hansen J-statistic
according to which the over-identifying restrictions in the present set of GMM estimations
are invalid regardless of the instrumentalization. In order to ensure that the presence of
autocorrelation in the residuals it does not result in inconsistent and inefficient estimators,
we compute White-period standard errors (Arellano, 1987) which are robust to arbitrary serial
correlation and time-varying variances in the residuals. We test for the existence of first-order
and second-order serial autocorrelation by regressing the within regression residuals against
their one- and two-period lag. The underlying model allows for fixed effects and White-period
standard errors.35
5 Data
Ideally, the analysis of industry-specific bank lending effects of changes in credit demand and
monetary policy would build on firm level as well as bank level data. Bank level data allow
for the identification of the credit channel effects of monetary policy through bank lending
and firm level data allow for assessments regarding the operation of a credit channel through
balance sheet effects. Even though firm level data are available from the corporate balance
sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, they are not useful for our purpose because
they are only available at an annual frequency and subject to a large firm bias.36 Given
the unavailability of firm level data, we determine the bank lending effects of changes in
credit demand and monetary policy for industry aggregates. We compile industry data for
17 industries which include eight industries at the one-digit industry level and nine industries
at the two-digit industry level. The latter are sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry (see
Appendix A.1).
Bank level data on bank-specific balance sheet data and bank-specific credit supply to individual
industries is respectively obtained from the quarterly borrower statistics and monthly bank
balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the period 1992-2003. Because data
35Note, the conclusions regarding the existence of serial autocorrelation are robust to the way in which the
first- and second-order autocorrelation coefficient is computed. A simple least-squares estimator without fixed
effects and White-period standard errors produces comparable results.
36See Deutsche Bundesbank (1998b) for details.
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in 2003 display patterns which are unreconcilable with those in earlier years, we confine the
analysis of quarterly data to the period 1992:1-2002:4. The bank-specific balance sheet and
lending data display seasonal patterns. For each bank, these are removed by means of the
centered-moving average method. This is an admittedly simple adjustment procedure which
can be criticized for ignoring, for example, working day and leap year effects. However, it is the
preferred method in the present analysis because it is applicable despite the large number of
cross sections. Furthermore, a comparison of the seasonally adjusted and non-adjusted series
shows that the centered moving average procedure captures seasonal fluctuations well.
Information on industry production and industry prices is available from the New Cronos
database at a monthly frequency for most industries. For some industries, industry output is
approximated with industry value added. The corresponding data are provided by the German
federal statistical office. The monthly data on industry output and prices are converted into
quarterly data to match the frequency of the bank lending data. While data on industry output
is directly obtained for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4, information on industry prices is only
available as of 1995:1. In order to identify the 1992:1-1994:4 values, we regress the industry-
specific price index against a constant and the contemporaneous value of the aggregate price
index and use the coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) to extrapolate the
missing values on industry-specific prices. Industry prices for the wholesale and retail trade,
finance and insurance, transport and communication, and service sector are not available from
the New Cronos database. Instead, we construct them using information on nominal and real
value added from the German statistical office for the whole sample period 1992:1-2002:4.37
The New Cronos database and the corporate borrower statistics occasionally differ in terms of
industry aggregation. In particular, the corporate borrower statistics tend to refer to composites
of industries rather than to individual units. In order to adopt the same level of industry
aggregation, the New Cronos data on industry production and industry characteristics are also
combined across some industries. The composite indices are constructed by controlling for
the relative importance of the single industries in the composite. Limited by data availability,
the weights are approximated as the 1992-2002 ratio of value added of industry i to aggregate
value added of the industries included in the composite. Since the weights are time-invariant,
the use of the 1992-2002 average as weight seems to be innocuous.
We estimate the industry-specific bank lending models for aggregate and short-term bank
credit supply. The focus on short-term lending is motivated by existing studies which point
to an immediate response of short- rather than long-term lending to changes in monetary
policy (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993; Kakes and Sturm, 2002). Short-term loans are also likely
to respond more to cyclical fluctuations in industry output and prices and to changes in
monetary policy since they are renewed at shorter intervals than long-term or average loans.
The importance of short-term credit can be explained in terms of expectations. If firms belief
that output growth, inflation, and interest rates are mean stationary, they will expect an
increase in inflation or interest rates, and a decline in output growth today to be followed
by an opposite movement tomorrow. Firms, therefore, also expect real income and, hence,
37Note, the German statistical office reports data on nominal and real value added jointly for the (i) wholesale
and retail trade sector and (ii) transport and communication sector. Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle the
industry-specific price for each of these sectors, but have to rely on the composite price measure.
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internal funds of finance to evolve as a predictable mean-stationary long-term growth path. As
a consequence, they are more likely to cushion temporary changes in internal funds with short-
rather than medium- or long-term external credit.38. As regards an increase in interest rates,
short-term lending may also increase because firms shorten the maturity of debt in anticipation
of lower future interest rates.
Besides these considerations, we also focus on short-term lending because long-term credit
is determined by factors which cannot easily be constructed given the available information.
For example, long-term financing needs depend on strategic considerations and expectations
regarding future changes in industry activity and prices. Because data on, e.g., expected
output and prices are unavailable at a low level of industry aggregation, we cannot estimate
model (1) for long-term lending without incurring the risk of reporting biased and inconsistent
estimates due to an omitted variable bias. Surely, the omitted variable bias may also affect the
results for the model with aggregate lending, where aggregate lending is computed as the sum
of short-, medium-, and long-term bank credit. The evidence on aggregate lending should,
therefore, be viewed as reference point to judge the plausibility of the results for short-term
lending.
In order to ensure the reliability of the empirical results, the quarterly data are screened
along different lines. Firstly, the data are checked for outliers. Outlier detection concerns
the behavioral relationship between variables as well as the distribution of variables. One
behavioral relationship concerns the need of banks to meet their balance sheet constraint.
For the requirements that total assets equal total liabilities, the study keeps all but 5 data
points.39 Another relationship is defined as the need to have positive entries for credit supply
and total assets. In the present sample, at most 18 data points for industry-specific loans and
47 data points for total assets do not meet the non-negativity constraint. These observations
are excluded from the sample.
As concerns the distribution of variables, the outlier detection procedure is typically realized
for variables in levels. The exception concerns the volume of bank credit and total bank
assets. In order to avoid the exclusion of very large and very small banks on the ground of
sheer size, the outlier detection procedure for total assets and the volume of bank credit is
implemented for their first log-differences.40 Regardless of the variable, outliers are detected by
using the sequential outlier rejection (SOR) algorithm described in Corney (2002). In contrast
to standard methods like the z-score or box plot method, this outlier detection procedure
adopts a sequential approach which accounts for the effect of outliers on the standard error
in the sample. Furthermore, the SOR approach does not assume the normal distribution of
banks at any point in time. This property is particularly valuable since the hypothesis of normal
distribution of banks can be rejected for all sampled variables (see Table 1 and Table 3). The
SOR algorithm requires the data to be repeatedly clustered using any clustering algorithm. The
present analysis uses k-means clustering for each of the main banking groups, with k = 2.41
38See Kakes and Sturm (2002) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) for the effect of interest rate changes
on the demand for short-term finance.
39A data point is a single time observation associated with an individual bank (e.g. the observation associated
with bank i in 1992:1).
40See Worms (2003) for a similar procedure.
41The large number of observations and computer limitations preclude the definition of more than two
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For each repetition, the sum-squared error for k-means is computed which describes the sum-
squared deviation of each data point in the sample to the nearest cluster center. The data point
which contributes most to the sum-squared error for k-means is excluded from the sample.
For each point in time and each banking group, the clustering algorithm is iteratively applied
to the data set. The number of iterations is roughly equal to 5 percent of the number of
banks at each point in time.42 That is, the first step of the procedure treats 5 percent of
all banks at each point in time as potential outlier. The second step builds on the iteratively
excluded observations from step one and determines the actual number of outliers by using
the second difference of the sum-squared error term. Under the assumption that the error rate
is driven by outliers, the second derivative is close to zero and the cumulative sum thereof is
constant for the sequence of data which excludes atypical observations. In the present paper,
we exclude any data point as outliers if it explains more than one percent of the cumulative
sum of the second derivative. Similar to other outlier detection methods (e.g., box plot method
and z-approach), the choice of threshold is arbitrary.
The analysis is confined to institutions which have the status of a monetary finance institute
(MFI) throughout the whole sample period. The restricted focus is necessitated by the change
in data definition. Until 1998:4, non-MFI’s were treated as financial institutions and the
Deutsche Bundesbank borrower statistics reported lending by these institutions to enterprises
and households. As of 1999:1, non-MFI’s are treated as enterprises and the borrower statistics
do no longer report lending by, but credit supply to these institutions. In order to avoid that
the definitional change of non-MFI’s from being creditors to being debtors may bias the results,
we exclude banks with a non-MFI status in any quarter during the sample period. This leads
to a loss of 1400 data points from the commercial banking group and 208 data points from
the cooperative banking group.
6 Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results of the fixed effects dynamic panel estimation. We
summarize the bank lending effects of loan demand and loan supply changes by computing
the long-run elasticities of bank lending with respect to the explanatory variables in model
(1).43 The industry-specific long-run coefficients αLR,i are defined as the sum of the lags of
the variable in question divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lagged bank
credit variable: αLR,i =
PJ
j=1 γij
1−PJj=1 βij
, where J=4.44 Since the long-run coefficients are a non-linear
clusters.
42The number of iterations depends on the availability of data in a given time period and a given banking
group. The results are not sensitive to a larger number of iterations.
43We follow the existing literature when referring to long-run elasticities (e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2002b;
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2003; Ehrmann et al., 2003). An alternative and more intuitive
interpretation views the ’long-run’ coefficient as the lasting response of bank lending growth to changes in
either bank credit demand or monetary policy.
44The properties of the residuals do not change with J=5.
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function of the estimated parameters, we derive the corresponding standard errors by means
of the delta method.45
The empirical model is estimated for different combinations of banking groups. One sample
jointly includes the primary institutions of the commercial, savings, and credit cooperative
sector. This group is subsequently referred to as the aggregate banking group. Group-specific
effects are captured with banking group dummies for the savings and commercial banking
group. However, the dummies turn out to be statistically insignificant in almost all specifi-
cations which suggests weak or no banking group effects for savings and commercial banks
relative to credit cooperatives. In view of this finding, the subsequent evidence for the aggre-
gate banking group refers to the results from estimations without banking group dummies.
We also estimate the model for the aggregate credit cooperative banking sector46, with bank-
ing dummies for the commercial credit cooperative banking group and Raiffeisen banks. In
contrast to the aggregate banking group, the dummies turn out to be statistically significant
for most industry bank lending functions.
In order to allow for the possibility of parameter heterogeneity across banking groups, another
sample is separately defined for the three main sub-groups of the credit cooperative banking
group (i.e., rural, commercial, and Raiffeisen banks) and for savings banks. The importance of
parameter heterogeneity was suggested by the ANOVA evidence in section 3.1 which points to
structural differences between (i) the savings and cooperative banking group and (ii) the sub-
groups of the cooperative banking sector and, hence, to panel heterogeneity. When estimating
individual models for the savings and credit cooperative banking group, we assume cross-bank
homogeneity in the interest rate elasticity of loan demand and, hence, cross-bank similarities
in the distribution of bank-dependent and bank-independent customers within each individual
banking group. We do not estimate an individual model for the commercial banking group
or for the head institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector because they
operate product portfolios which differ from those of the local savings and credit cooperative
banks. Besides, estimates for an individual sample of commercial banks are not reported since
the number of observations and cross sections is low. The fixed number of observations causes
the fixed effects estimator and the robust covariance matrix estimates to be inconsistent even
though T is large.
Given the evidence in favor of (weak) regional effects in section 3.3, we also include a dummy
variable which discriminates banks by their location in either East- or West-Germany to control
for regional structural differences in industry structure and in the degree of concentration of
the banking market. As shown by Fischer (2001), local banking markets are more concentrated
in East-Germany than in West-Germany. Also, he documents that (i) firms with business in
local areas with concentrated banking markets are more bank dependent than firms in less
concentrated banking markets and (ii) firms have higher average ratios of bank loans to total
assets in concentrated banking markets than in less concentrated banking markets. One may,
therefore, hypothesize that the bank lending effects of monetary policy are stronger in East-
45To conserve on space, we only report the short-run coefficient for the one-period lag of the normalized
bank characteristic. The short-run coefficients for the remaining variables are available on request.
46The underlying sample combines information on commercial and rural credit cooperatives and Raiffeisen
banks.
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than in West-Germany. However, the regional dummy turns out to be statistically insignificant
in almost all specifications. Because this suggests that structural differences in regional banking
markets do not explain bank lending behavior, the empirical results are reported for estimations
which do not include the regional dummy.
6.1 Analysis of Variance Tests
The representation of the results is complicated by the cross-sectional dimension of the study.
To condense the analysis, section 6.1 first reports test statistics of one- and two-way analysis
of variance which illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of bank characteristic,
the choice of aggregate and short-term lending, and the choice of industry and banking group.
The test statistics are computed irrespective of the significance properties of the coefficient
estimates. If we would confine the analysis to industries for which significant estimates are
reported, ANOVA would not be feasible. Despite the inclusion of insignificant estimates, the
results are still deemed to be illustrative. On the one hand, we only compute test statistics for
variables for which most industry-specific estimates are statistically significant, i.e., for industry
output growth, industry inflation, and the interest rate change. Test statistics are not reported
for the interaction terms because of pronounced differences in their statistical significance and
sign properties across the different bank lending specifications. On the other hand, the sign
and magnitude of insignificant industry-specific coefficient estimates on either industry output
growth, inflation, or the interest rate change compares well with those of significant estimates
regardless of the choice of bank characteristic.
The remainder of this study does not consider the evidence for the bank lending functions
of the metals producing industry. This is because of serial correlation of the residuals in the
corresponding estimations which results in biased and inconsistent estimates. The autocorre-
lation properties do not improve in estimations with alternative lag structure and are robust
to the structure of the model.
We first investigate whether the coefficient estimates for industry output growth, inflation, and
the interest rate change are influenced by the choice of bank characteristic, i.e., bank asset size,
capitalization, liquidity, or short-term interbank claims. Because the results are robust to the
choice of banking group and do not differ for aggregate and short-term lending, we only report
the results for the aggregate banking group and for short-term lending.47 The results in Table
7 (column 3-6) show that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients across bank characteristics
cannot be rejected. The choice of bank characteristic, hence, does not significantly affect the
long-run sensitivity of bank lending with respect to either industry-specific bank credit demand
or the money market interest rate.
-Insert Table 7 here-
We next ask whether the long-run coefficients of the sampled variables depend on the choice
of aggregate and short-term bank lending. Because the coefficient estimates are insensitive
47The results for the remaining banking groups are available on request.
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to the choice of bank characteristic, we only report the one-way ANOVA test statistics for
bank asset size. The evidence in Table 7 (column 7-10) points to the equality of the long-run
coefficients for aggregate and short-term lending. This, in turn, suggests that conclusions
regarding the determinants of bank lending growth do not differ for aggregate and short-term
credit.48 This results holds with respect to all sampled variables.
We conclude the discussion by formally testing whether differences in bank lending effects are
accounted for by banking groups or by industries. To this end, we compute the test statistics
of a two-way analysis of variance. The banking groups are composed of savings banks and
the three main sub-groups of the credit cooperatives sector. The number of industries is
determined by the white noise properties of the estimated residuals. We include the eight
industries at the one-digit industry level and eight sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry.
Given the one-way ANOVA test statistics, we only report the results for short-term lending
and bank asset size, noting that the evidence for aggregate lending and the remaining bank
characteristics does not differ.49 Table 8 summarizes the results.
-Insert Table 8 here-
The analysis of variance shows that differences in the responsiveness of short-term bank lending
growth to industry output growth and industry inflation are attributable to industries, but not
to banking groups. That is, the evidence stresses discernible industry dissimilarities in the
bank lending effects of industry output growth and inflation. In contrast to output growth
and inflation, differences in the long-run bank lending effects of interest rate changes are
explained by banking groups in industries. However, industry effects appear to be the main
source of variation in the bank lending effects of monetary policy. This conclusion builds on
the observation that the F-value for the industry effect exceeds the corresponding value for
the banking group effect.
6.2 Evidence from Industry-Specific Bank Lending Functions
The analysis of variance shows that industries are the main source of differences in the bank
lending effects of industry credit demand and monetary policy. In addition, we find the results
regarding the bank lending effects of industry output growth, industry inflation, and monetary
policy to be insensitive to the choice of aggregate and short-term lending. Motivated by these
findings and to condense on space, this section presents and discusses the empirical evidence
on the determinants of industry-specific short-term bank lending growth for the aggregate
banking group. In a first step, section 6.2.1 reports the response of bank lending growth to
industry output growth, industry inflation, and changes in the money market interest rate.
48Similar conclusions prevail when we compare the results for short- and long-term lending and short-, long-
term, and aggregate lending. For reasons mentioned in section 5, we do not report the results for long-term
lending.
49The ANOVA test statistics for estimations with bank capitalization, liquidity, and interbank assets and for
aggregate lending are available on request.
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Section 6.2.2 then discusses the interaction terms between bank characteristics and monetary
policy to draw conclusion as to the existence of credit channel effects of monetary policy
through bank lending. Table 9 summarizes the coefficient estimates for the industry-specific
bank lending functions.
The analysis of the interaction terms is subject to a shortcoming. As stated, the significance
properties of the interaction terms preclude tests regarding the relative contribution of indus-
tries and banking groups as source of variation. Visual inspection of significant interaction
terms points, however, to considerable differences in the sign and magnitude of the underlying
credit channel effects across industries as well as banking groups. The differences are such that
they in principle warrant a separate discussion of the coefficient estimates of all interaction
terms. However, this is beyond scope given the large number of industry-specific bank lending
models by bank characteristic, banking group, and loan maturity.50 We can only acknowledge
that conclusions regarding the credit channel effects of monetary policy depend on the choice
of model specification and stress the interaction terms for short-term bank lending growth
for the aggregate banking group. Because the results regarding the credit channel effects of
monetary policy vary with the choice of bank characteristic, we stress the evidence for bank
asset size, capitalization, liquidity, and short-term interbank claims.
6.2.1 The Bank Lending Effects of Loan Demand and Monetary Policy
We report evidence for individual industries and for the grand total of industries. The evidence
for the grand total of industries is our benchmark in the discussion of the industry-specific
bank lending functions. Besides, when emphasizing the results for the grand total of industries,
we can compare the present empirical findings with the evidence of earlier studies which do
not adopt an industry-specific focus. In order to facilitate the readability of the results, we
label industries by using abbreviations. For example, the finance and insurance industry is
subsequently introduced as finance sector and the transport and communication sector is
referred to as transport sector. Appendix A.1 provides details. Because the evidence in section
6.1 shows that the choice of bank characteristic does not affect the long-run sensitivity of
bank lending with respect to industry output growth, industry inflation, or the money market
interest rate, we provide a general discussion of the results regarding the industry-specific bank
lending effects of bank credit demand and monetary policy.
Considering the response of bank lending growth to industry output growth, the entries in
Table 9 illustrate that bank lending to the grand total of industries increases in response to
higher output growth. The positive output response of lending to the grand total reflects the
statistically significant and positive response of lending to growth in agriculture, construction,
trade, services, and the food manufacturing sector. At least for the construction sector, the
positive reaction of bank lending is influenced by the 1992-1995 re-unification construction
boom period which induced heavy investment. Opposite relationships exist for the manufac-
turing sector and sub-sectors thereof which suggests that manufacturing firms demand less
bank credit in response to output growth.51 Possible reasons are higher internal flows of fi-
50The results for aggregate lending and for the remaining banking groups are available on request.
51Also see Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) for a similar conclusion.
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nance which reduce external financing needs and/ or the absence of promising future economic
prospects which yield disincentives for investment. Indeed, German manufacturing has expe-
rienced a continuous decline in terms of relative value added during the 1990s.52 Next to the
manufacturing industry, we also find an inverse relationship between bank lending growth and
output growth for the finance sector. In contrast to the manufacturing industry, the finance
sector accounts for an increasingly larger share of aggregate value added. The decline in bank
lending may, hence, reflect the effect of higher internal cash flows which reduce the need for
bank finance.
As regards the response of bank lending growth to inflation, it is significant and positive for the
grand total of industries. The positive reaction of bank lending to the grand total of industries
is explained by the positive response of bank lending to all industries, but the transport and
communication and machinery and transport equipment manufacturing sector.
-Insert Table 9 here-
Turning to the interest rate response of bank lending, the evidence confirms the view that
higher interest rates cause lending to the grand total of industries to contract. The decline
in bank lending reflects the negative effect of higher interest rates on bank reserves and
precautionary lending on the part of banks in response to an increase in the risk of loan
default. The evidence in Table 9 also illustrates that this response is a weighted average of
the interest rate reaction of all industries. We find unanimous cross-industry differences in
the nature of the interest rate response of bank lending. The negative interest rate response
of lending to the grand total of industries reflects lower bank credit supply to the energy,
manufacturing, and transport industry, with the interest rate effect being most pronounced for
the first two sectors. The strength of the effect for the energy and manufacturing industry is
attributed to the comparatively high capital intensity of production which is associated with
a higher probability of loan losses (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996). For the manufacturing
sector, the decline in lending reveals the negative interest rate effects of bank credit supply to
the chemicals and coke, rubber and plastic, wood and paper, and textiles producing sector.
The negative interest rate effects are ameliorated by higher lending to the construction, trade,
and finance industry and to producers of non-metallic mineral, machinery and transport equip-
ment, and electrical and optical equipment goods. The positive interest rate response of
lending to construction is not consistent with expectations. However, it can be attributed to
the structural and cyclical characteristics of the construction sector. As regards the structural
properties, the construction industry is characterized by a large share of small firms which
predominantly obtain bank credit from local credit cooperatives and regional savings banks.53
Knowledge of local market conditions and local debtors reduces information asymmetries and
fosters housebank relationships. Housebank relationships, in turn, facilitate the access to
bank finance in general and in periods of high interest rates and low demand in particular.
Considering cyclical factors, the positive interest rate response of bank lending reflects the
52The ratio of value added for manufacturing to value added for the grand total of industries declined from
0.26 in 1992 to 0.22 in 2002.
53Also see section 3.2.
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demand-driven re-unification boom in construction. Even during the 1991-1992 period of
high interest rates, demand for residential buildings and production plants was high and even
continued to increase.
The positive interest rate response of bank lending to the finance industry can be explained
in terms of financial stability considerations. A contraction in monetary policy lowers the net
present value of financial assets and impedes on the ability of finance and insurance companies
to generate profits on financial asset portfolios. When portfolio holders like firms or households
view the return on their portfolio investment unsatisfactory, they will withdraw their funds
from the finance and insurance sector. Besides return considerations, portfolio holders may
also withdraw funds to accommodate the negative effect of higher interest rates on internal
cash flows and, hence, liquidity. The drain of financial funds reduces the ability of finance
and insurance companies to meet liquidity requirements. Due to self-fulfilling prophecies and
herding behavior, this development may constitute a thread to the stability of the finance and
insurance sector, with possible spillover effects to the whole financial system. In view of these
relationships, the positive interest rate response of lending to the finance and insurance sector
describes the effort of banks to ensure the stability of the financial system.
The entries in Table 9 point to pronounced industry differences in the magnitude of the bank
lending effects of output growth, inflation, and interest rate changes. The largest response of
bank lending to changes in monetary policy, industry inflation, and output growth is observed
for the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. Indeed, bank lending to these sectors tends
to be more responsive than bank lending to the manufacturing aggregate or to the grand
total of industries. Next to the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, bank lending also
responds comparatively strongly to output growth in the finance industry and to inflation in
the construction and energy sector. The finance, construction, and energy industry and the
sub-sectors of manufacturing have in common that the share of credit to these sectors is
comparatively small (cf. Table 3). The evidence, hence, suggests that bank lending responds
more to output growth and inflation in industries which only account for a small share of a
bank’s loan portfolio. This, in turn, suggests that banks primarily re-distribute credit between
industries to which bank lending is relatively small and that the overall industry composition
of a bank’s loan portfolio is, accordingly, comparatively stable.
Overall, the evidence illustrates that the use of bank level data on aggregate lending only
provides an imperfect view on the bank lending effects of credit demand and monetary policy.
Our results indicate that the strength of aggregate bank lending effects clearly depends on
the industry structure of bank credit portfolios. This finding is particularly interesting for the
definition of monetary policy as it shows that the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on
industry structure.
6.2.2 Are there Bank Lending Effects of Monetary Policy?
So far, the discussion has focused on the direct effects of monetary policy. This section
presents the empirical results on the cross-bank differences in the interest rate response of
industry-specific bank lending. The analysis emphasizes the results for the interaction between
bank characteristics and monetary policy which capture the distributional effects of changes
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in the money market interest rate. As will be evident, conclusions as to the existence of
cross-bank differences in the interest rate response of bank lending are sensitive to the choice
of either bank asset size, capitalization, liquidity, and short-term interbank claims.
Existing studies question the usefulness of capitalization and liquidity as proxy variables of
the bank lending effects of monetary policy. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) argue that
the capital-to-asset ratio is an inappropriate measure of bank capitalization. The reason is
that bank capital does not illustrate the riskiness of a bank’s portfolio. It therefore does
not correctly describe the severity of information asymmetries which determines the ability of
banks to obtain non-reservable funding. Kashyap and Stein (2000) contemplate that liquidity
may provide a distorted view on the importance of bank balance sheet effects. This is because
liquidity is also determined by cash which cannot be freely used by banks since it is subject
to reserve requirements.54 Furthermore, Worms (2003) notes that bank lending reflects the
liquidity preferences of banks, with more liquid banks lending less per se. If this holds, cross-
bank differences in the interest rate sensitivity of bank lending are not uniquely attributable to
cross-bank differences in liquidity. We only mention these weaknesses associated with some
bank characteristics, but do not control for them for two reasons. Firstly, the share of cash in
total assets relative to other liquidity components is low and secondly, quarterly data on the
riskiness of capital are not available in the present dataset. Even though capitalization and
liquidity might be imperfect identifiers of bank credit supply effects of monetary policy, we
report the results for these bank characteristics because we still assume that these variables
influence the response of bank lending to interest rate changes.
Table 9 also contains the industry-specific bank lending effects of monetary policy associated
with cross-bank differences in asset size, capitalization, liquidity, or short-term interbank claims.
Conclusions regarding the bank lending effects of monetary policy transmission are sensitive
to the choice of bank characteristic and vary with the choice of industry. The evidence lends
strong support to the existence of bank size effects in monetary policy transmission. For the
grand total of industries and for almost all sampled industries, monetary policy contraction
causes bank lending of large banks to adjust less than bank credit of small banks. That is,
large banks are better able to insulate their lending activities against interest rate induced
changes in the availability of reservable and non-reservable funds of finance. Inconsistent with
the credit channel theory, the interest rate response of bank lending to the finance industry is
more pronounced for large than for small banks. This finding possibly reflects the importance
of commercial banks as source of lending to the finance industry (Table 3) and the fact that
commercial banks are on average larger in terms of asset size than savings banks and credit
cooperatives (Table 1). Insignificant effects are recorded in estimations for the construction
and transport sector and for the non-metallic goods and wood and paper products producing
sector. In contrast to bank asset size, cross-bank heterogeneity in capitalization does not
explain cross-bank differences in the interest rate sensitivity of bank credit to the grand total
of industries and to most individual industries. The exception is lending to agriculture, finance,
service, and manufacturing. Except for the agricultural sector, better capitalized banks adjust
lending by less than poorly capitalized banks.
54We do not control for this claim given the low share of cash in total assets relative to other liquidity
components and its time-invariability.
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Considering the broad and narrow measure of liquidity, the reaction of bank lending to the
grand total of industries is driven by broad as well as narrow liquidity. Again, the bank lending
effects of monetary policy differ across industries. Broad and/or narrow liquidity effects explain
cross-bank differences in the interest rate response of lending to the agricultural, construction,
trade, transport, textiles, food, machinery and transport equipment, and electrical and optical
equipment producing sector. With the exception of lending to the machinery and transport
equipment and electrical and optical equipment producing sector, liquidity helps to attenuate
the interest rate response of bank lending, with the interest rate response of bank lending
being larger for less liquid banks.
Except for agriculture and the machinery and transport equipment sector, significant liquidity
effects only prevail for either the broad or narrow liquidity measure. For these sectors, the
broad liquidity effect is driven by narrow liquidity rather than by short-term interbank claims.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the significant short-term interbank effects are confined to very
few industries: construction, trade, and transport. Because interbank claims are insignificant
in explaining the interest rate response of credit supply to industries for which bank asset size
possesses explanatory power, bank asset size appears to capture the bank lending effects of
information asymmetries. That is, the evidence in the present study does not lend support to
the finding of Worms (2003) according to which interbank claims dwarf the effects associated
with bank asset size.
Comparing the magnitude of the distributional effects of monetary policy, differences prevail
across bank characteristics. Indeed, cross-bank asymmetries in the interest rate response of
bank lending are least pronounced for bank asset size and most pronounced for estimations
with bank capitalization and short-term interbank claims. The evidence, hence, reveals that
bank size is not the main determinant of cross-bank differences in the response to monetary
policy changes. However, at least the relative importance of the capitalization effect should
not be overemphasized because we define capitalization without correcting for bank risk. Next
to these results, the entries in Table 9 also suggest that the strength of bank lending effects
of monetary policy differs between industries. In contrast to direct monetary policy effects,
the cross-industry differences appear to be unrelated to the relative weight of industries in a
bank’s credit portfolio.
Table 9 also reports the one-period lags of the bank characteristics. Even though the co-
efficients do not have an intrinsic meaning, they illustrate in combination with the direct
interest rate effect whether bank characteristics or interest rate changes drive the significance
of interaction terms. The evidence tends to be mixed. For the grand total of industries, the
significance of the interaction term is attributable to the direct bank lending effect of monetary
policy and to cross-bank differences in any of the bank characteristics. For the industry-specific
bank lending functions, the distributional effects of monetary policy are determined by either
monetary policy or bank characteristics, by both variables, or by none. For example, the sig-
nificance of the interaction term on asset size and capitalization in the estimation for total
manufacturing is driven by the the direct effect of monetary policy but not by bank charac-
teristics. For the transport sector, the absence of credit channel effects in estimations with
asset size seem to be driven by asset size given the evidence in favor of significant interest
rate effects. Again, the evidence demonstrates that studies for the grand total of industries
provide an incomplete view on the bank lending effects of monetary policy. Industry effects of
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monetary policy clearly exist and these determine the effectiveness of monetary policy for the
industry aggregate.
6.2.3 Comparison of the Results with Existing Studies
The present results for the grand total of industries match those in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and
Worms (2003) only partly. One possible source of divergence are differences in the definition
of bank credit. While the earlier studies define bank credit for lending to households and
the grand total of industries, we do not include household lending.55 Another source of
heterogeneity concerns the outlier adjustment procedure. Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms
(2003) identify outliers by assuming the normal distribution of banks, while we allow for skews
in the distribution. The studies are, therefore, likely to define outliers along different lines
which leads to the exclusion of different observations. The most striking difference, however,
concerns the estimation methodology. Earlier studies estimate the dynamic panel model using
the GMM estimator. We find this estimator to be inapplicable in the present study to the
long sample period 1992-2002 as well as to the shorter sample period 1992-1998 as used by
Worms (2003). We do not estimate the model for the short sample period with the fixed
effects estimator because the finite sample bias would be stronger.
Despite these differences, our results are in line with those of Ehrmann et al. (2003) according
to which bank lending grows in response to output growth and inflation and declines in the
wake of monetary contraction. Our results only compare with those of Worms (2003) in terms
of inflation and monetary policy. Furthermore, the present results are consistent with those in
Ehrmann et al. (2003) according to which cross-bank differences in the interest rate sensitivity
of aggregate bank credit cannot be attributed to differences in capitalization, but to differences
in liquidity. However, the present study reports evidence which lends support to the existence
of bank size effects in monetary policy transmission. In contrast to Worms (2003), the size
effects are not driven by interbank claims since they also prevail in estimations which do not
control for interbank claims.
6.2.4 Synthesis
Summarizing the results of the industry-specific bank lending functions, the evidence shows
that bank lending growth is industry specific, being predominantly driven by cyclical changes
in industry output growth and industry inflation and, hence, by industry-specific bank credit
demand. The empirical findings show that the response of industry-specific bank lending to
changes in monetary policy is comparatively small. Furthermore, they lend weak support to
the transmission of monetary policy shocks through bank lending effects. If at all, cross-
bank differences in the response of bank lending to changes in monetary policy are primarily
attributable to size and capitalization effects. We demonstrate that the determinants of
55Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms (2003) do not report evidence for short-term lending but for aggregate
bank credit. Because our results for aggregate and short-term lending do not differ, we generalize our results
when comparing them with earlier studies and do not make a distinction between short-term and aggregate
lending.
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bank lending growth differ across industries. In fact, the discussion stresses the existence of
significant cross-industry differences in the bank lending effects of industry output growth,
industry inflation, and monetary policy. Bank lending growth, thus, depends on the relative
importance of industries in a bank’s loan portfolio.
6.3 Robustness Tests
In order to determine the robustness of the empirical findings, we modify the structure of
the base specification (1) along several lines. To conserve on space, we only provide a verbal
description of the corresponding evidence.56 One set of estimations eliminates output growth
and inflation from the base model to test whether industry demand factors dwarf the bank
lending effects of interest rate changes. The test is motivated by the evidence from the base
model according to which bank lending growth is predominantly determined by industry output
growth and industry inflation rather than by monetary policy. The results for the modified
model confirm those for the base specification. We still find the direct interest rate effects
on bank lending to be small, with the magnitude of the effects being in the range suggested
by the base specification. The evidence in favor of credit channel effects of monetary policy
through bank lending is still comparatively strong for asset size, but relatively weak for the
remaining bank characteristics. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates from the augmented
specification closely resemble those from the base model.
Another set of estimations re-estimates the base model with more than one bank characteristic.
One specification interacts each bank characteristic individually with monetary policy (i.e.,
single interaction), while a second model interacts two bank characteristics with each other
as well as with monetary policy (i.e., double interaction).57 We include more than one bank
characteristic simultaneously for two reasons. One reason is the likely endogeneity between
bank asset size and liquidity and bank capitalization and liquidity: large or better capitalized
banks might be more liquid than small or poorly capitalized banks. The other reason refers to
the possibility that models with only one bank characteristic report evidence which also captures
the effects associated with other characteristics. This might be particularly true for interbank
claims. Worms (2003) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) have shown that interbank claims attenuate
the effects of asset size and dominate the liquidity or capitalization effects of monetary policy.
Although the present study has shown that asset size explains the average interest rate response
of banks in estimations which do not control for interbank claims, interbank claims may still
capture part of the size effects. When including more than one bank characteristic, the models
with single and double interactions yield evidence which largely confirms the findings of the
base specification. Bank lending growth is predominantly determined by bank credit demand
and not by monetary policy or the distributional effects of monetary policy. The strength of
the underlying effects significantly differs between industries.
The model with single interactions jointly includes asset size and capitalization in addition to
either broad or narrow liquidity, or interbank assets. The evidence from the augmented model
suggests the independence of the effects associated with each bank characteristic. For example,
56The coefficient estimates for all robustness tests are available on request.
57See Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms (2003) for the structure of the model.
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the effects associated with bank capitalization are still comparatively strong, while bank size
effects are relatively small. In fact, the strength of significant bank size, capitalization, liquidity,
and interbank effects does not vary much between the base and augmented model. We
therefore conclude that distributional effects of monetary policy reveal size and capitalization
effects which are not driven by interbank claims or bank liquidity. Similarly, interbank assets do
not influence the evidence on bank liquidity effects. For most bank lending functions, interbank
assets are statistically insignificant and broad liquidity effects reflect the effects associated with
narrow liquidity.
The model with double interaction terms tests whether cross-bank differences in the interest
rate response of bank lending depend on the interdependence of effects associated with (i)
interbank claims and either bank asset size, capitalization, or liquidity and (ii) liquidity and
either bank asset size or capitalization. The hypothesis is that the effect of interbank claims
or liquidity on the interest rate response of bank lending is smaller for large and better capital-
ized banks. Summarizing the results, we find the double interaction terms to be statistically
insignificant in the bank lending functions of almost all industries. The only significant re-
sponses are recorded for estimations with interbank claims and either asset size, capitalization,
or liquidity, but not in estimations with liquidity and either asset size or capitalization. When
significant, the evidence tends to be inconsistent with expectations: interbank effects on bank
lending are smaller for (i) small banks (machinery and transport equipment sector), (ii) poorly
capitalized banks (electrical and optical equipment sector), (iii) less liquid banks (construction,
services, wood and paper producing sector). Anticipated relationships prevail for the grand
total of industries for which interbank effects of monetary policy on bank lending are smaller
for large banks. In addition, interbank effects are smaller for liquid banks in estimations for
the rubber and plastic and machinery and transport equipment sector.
As an alternative test we ask whether the results are sensitive to the way we define the
explanatory variables of the base specification. The model in equation (1) includes industry-
specific bank lending, output, and inflation without weighting each of these components by
the corresponding bank-specific aggregate. In expressing loans in absolute terms, the present
analysis follows Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Ehrmann et al.
(2003), Worms (2003), Hu¨lsewig, Mayer, and Wollmersha¨user (2005), among others. In reality,
banks operate portfolios, with lending to industry i being part of a diversification strategy. The
relative importance of industries in a bank’s portfolio, hence, differs. In order to control for
differences in the importance of industries, we re-define the industry-specific variables relative
to the aggregate. Doing so, we do not only control for differences in the relative importance
of industries, but also for structural breaks which result from re-definitions in the composition
of industries. Furthermore, we can also control for the effect of those mergers which do not
appear as outliers. When using ratios, merger-driven jumps in lending are ameliorated or
even eliminated.58 The results do not differ qualitatively from those of the base specification
and confirm that bank lending growth is determined by bank credit demand rather than by
monetary policy. Moreover, conclusions regarding the distributional effects of monetary policy
on bank lending do not differ much between the base and augmented specification.
So far, the robustness checks involve structural changes of the base specification, using data
58See Appendix A.3 for the structure of the underlying model.
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for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4. This sample period captures years of exceptional cir-
cumstances as caused by German re-unification. Particular to this process is above average
credit demand by all industries (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996). In order to assess the
sensitivity of the results to re-unification effects, we also estimate the base specification for
the period 1995:1-2002:4. For almost all industries, the results for the shorter time period do
not differ qualitatively from those obtained for the longer time period. The only exception is
the manufacturing industry. In contrast to the long sample period, bank lending to this sector
is predicted to expand in response to industry inflation and to contract in reaction to higher
interest rates. Conclusions regarding the existence of bank lending effects of monetary policy
also change for bank asset size. In contrast to the long sample, the interest rate response
of bank lending does no longer decrease with asset size, but increases. The relationships
for output growth and the remaining bank characteristics do not change. The evidence for
manufacturing is, hence, influenced by German re-unification. Visual inspection of the data
shows that the results are driven by differences in the time-series pattern of inflation during
1992-1993 and 1994-2002. Manufacturing prices were constant during 1992-1993, while the
share of short-term credit to manufacturing declined. Manufacturing prices only increased as
of 1994.
Overall, conclusions as to the response of bank lending to changes in monetary policy and
bank credit demand are robust to alternative model specifications. Regardless of the model,
we find strong evidence that credit supply effects of monetary policy are small. Significant
cross-industry differences still prevail which demonstrates that the sensitivity of a bank’s credit
portfolio to monetary policy changes or economic conditions clearly depends on the industry
composition of a credit portfolio.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the bank lending effects of bank credit demand and monetary
policy for Germany for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4, using a unique data set with bank
level data on bank balance sheet items and bank industry lending. In contrast to existing work
on the credit channel effects of monetary policy, we explicitly focused on the industry effects of
bank lending and estimated bank lending functions for eight industries at the one-digit industry
level and for nine sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry at the two-digit industry level. The
bank lending functions were defined for aggregate and short-term lending and for five individual
banking groups. In line with existing studies, we used bank asset size, capitalization, liquidity,
and short-term interbank claims as proxy variables of cross-bank differences in the severity of
information asymmetries.
The evidence from dynamic fixed effects panel estimation shows that bank lending growth
responds relatively strongly to industry output growth and inflation. Credit supply effects of
monetary policy tend to be a less important determinant of bank lending growth. Our empirical
findings lend strong support to the existence of industry effects of bank lending: industries are
the most important source of variation in the bank lending effects of bank credit demand and
monetary policy. Banking group effects are comparatively weak. This, in turn, suggests that
the institutional setting of the German banking system is a relatively unimportant determinant
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of bank lending growth. The evidence lends mixed support to the credit channel theory
according to which cross-bank differences in the interest rate response of bank lending can
be explained with cross-bank heterogeneities in bank asset size, capitalization, liquidity, and
short-term interbank claims. Again, the conclusions are very sensitive to the choice of industry
and also depend on the choice of bank characteristic and banking group. When significant,
the credit channel effects of monetary policy are much smaller than the bank credit demand
effects. Overall, our results suggest that the industry composition of bank credit portfolios
determines bank lending growth and - more important from an economic policy perspective -
the effectiveness of monetary policy.
We expect that the evidence in favor of industry effects of bank lending would also prevail in
estimations which control for two shortcomings of the present analysis. One weakness concerns
the assumption that positive and negative shocks to industry output growth, industry inflation,
and monetary policy have a symmetric effect on bank lending growth. In reality, asymmetries
are likely to prevail given that credit conditions worsen more in times of recessions than they
improve in times of economic booms and that prices are sticky downwards but flexible upwards.
Furthermore, we estimated a reduced-form model which does not control for the sensitivity
of loan demand to monetary policy changes. That is, the interest rate sensitivity of bank
lending reflects the interest rate response of bank credit supply as well as the interest rate
response of bank credit demand. The interest rate sensitivity of loan demand, in turn, reflects
the operation of alternative monetary policy transmission channels such as the interest rate or
exchange rate channel.
Besides solving these issues, the present empirical results offer the following avenues for future
research. Firstly, the evidence suggests that cross-industry differences in the response of bank
lending to changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy cause the re-allocation of bank
credit from one industry to another, ceteris paribus.59 Because industry performance also
depends on the access to external finance, it would be particularly interesting from a policy
perspective to determine the degree of sectoral credit shifts. If large, sectoral credit shifts
will cause firms in some industries to be credit constraint even in absence of credit market
imperfections. Secondly, the present paper has assumed that industry output growth and
industry inflation affect bank lending unilaterally. However, the causal relationship is equally
likely to run from bank lending growth to output growth and inflation. Panel causality tests
would help to determine the nature and strength of the uni- or bi-directional relationships.
Because conclusions are likely to differ between industries, the evidence from panel causality
tests would provide more details on the determinants of the industry structure of bank credit
portfolios.
This list of ideas is certainly not exhaustive. It becomes evident, however, that the present
study should be viewed as starting point for future research on the industry effects of bank
lending.
59The ceteris paribus condition refers to profitability and efficiency of industries.
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Appendix A
Data Sources and Descriptions
A.1 Data Description
The following table lists the industries for which data on economic activity, prices, and industry
characteristics are compiled. The second column labels the industry as it will be abbreviated
throughout the paper.
Industry Abbreviation Source
Grand total NC
Mining and quarrying; Electricity, gas, and water supply Energy NC
Total manufacturing NC
Food products, beverages and tobacco Food NC
Textiles and textile products Textiles NC
Wood and products of wood and cork Wood NC
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing Paper NC
Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel Coke NC
Chemicals and chemical products Chemicals NC
Rubber and plastics products Rubber and plastic NC
Other non-metallic mineral products Non-metallic mineral NC
Basic metals and fabricated metal products Metals NC
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. Machinery NC
Electrical and optical equipment Electrical equipment NC
Transport equipment Transport equipment NC
Construction Construction NC
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing Agriculture GSO
Services Service GSO
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs Trade GSO
Transport and communication Transport GSO
Finance and insurance Finance GSO
The empirical analysis does not include all industries individually, but also combinations of
sectors. An aggregation of sectors is necessitated by the definition of industry sectors in the
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Bundesbank borrower statistics. The following industries are treated as a single unit: wood
and paper; coke and chemicals; machinery and transport equipment.
With few exceptions, monthly data on the industry production index and industry price index,
and annual data on the number of enterprises with 1 to 19 employees are compiled from
the New Cronos database of Eurostat (NC). The monthly data are converted into quarterly
data. Industry data on agriculture, services, wholesale and retail trade, finance and insurance,
and transport and communication are obtained from the German statistical office (GSO).
Information on value added, employment, gross capital stock, imports, exports, and operating
surplus are from the OECD’s STAN database for Industrial Analysis. The data are available
at an annual frequency.
Data on bank characteristics are compiled from the Bundesbank’s monthly bank balance sheet
statistics. The following variables are used:
• Total assets (TA)
• Bank capital (K)
• Liquidity (A)
Bank capital includes subscribed capital, reserves, capital represented by participation rights
and the fund for general banking risk. Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash; balances with the
central banks; treasury bills, treasury certificates, and similar debt instruments issued by public
authorities (eligible for refinancing); debt securities; shares and other variable-yield securities;
claims on credit institutions with an agreed maturity or redeemable at notice of one year or
less (short-term interbank claims).60
Data on bank-specific lending to eight main industries and nine sub-sectors of the manufactur-
ing industry are compiled from the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
A.2 Variable Description
The vector of bank characteristics Xb in equation (1) includes variables related to bank ef-
ficiency and profitability: total assets (TA), liquidity (A), and bank capital (K). In line with
existing studies (cf. Ehrmann et al., 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2003),
the level of bank-specific capital Capb, broad liquidity Bliqb, narrow liquidity Nliqb, and short-
60The determinants of liquidity are ranked according to liquidity. From the top to the bottom, liquidity
declines. See Bu¨schgen (1998), chapter 4.B for details.
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term interbank claims Ibkb is normalized with respect to the average across all banks and time
according to
Capbt =
Kbt
TAbt
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
1
Nb
Nb∑
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Kbt
TAbt
)
, (2)
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)
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Abt − Ibkbt
TAbt
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
1
Nb
Nb∑
b=1
Abt − Ibkbt
TAbt
)
, (4)
Ibkbt =
Ibkbt
TAbt
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
(
1
Nb
Nb∑
b=1
Ibkbt
TAbt
)
, (5)
respectively. The bank characteristics are expressed in terms of total assets to de-trend these
series. To this end, we assume that bank capitalization, liquidity, and interbank claims follow
similar trends as asset size. Total assets (TA) are also normalized with respect to the mean
across all banks, but de-trending requires the normalization for each single data point. This
yields the following measure of bank asset size
Sizebt = logTAbt − 1
Nb
Nb∑
b=1
logTAbt. (6)
Normalization with respect to the average across all banks means that the indicator variables
Size, Cap, Bliq, Nliq, and Ibk sum to zero over all observations. Because of this property, the
interaction terms in equation (1) are on average equal to zero. In addition, the coefficient
estimate γ1j directly reflects the average effect of monetary policy on bank credit growth.
A.3 Alternative Model Specification
In order to control for the relative importance of industries in a bank’s portfolio relative to the
aggregate, the base specification in equation (1) is rewritten as
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∆
Lbi,t
Lb,t
= αb +
p∑
j=1
βij∆
Lbi,t−j
Lb,t−j
+
p∑
j=1
γ1j∆rm,t−j +
p∑
j=1
γ2,ij∆
IPi,t−j
IPt−j
+
p∑
j=1
γ3,ij∆
Pricei,t−j
Pricet−j
+
γ4Xb,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
γ5Xb,t−1∆rm,t−j + bi,t. (7)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Bank Balance Sheet Variables, 1992-2002
N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis
1. Assets
Commercial BG
• Big B. 144 19.98 0.44 -0.29 1.90
• Regional, Private B. 6475 14.25 1.80 0.28 3.02
Savings BG
• Land B. 571 18.74 1.02 -1.84 10.11
• Savings B. 25200 14.69 0.94 0.06 3.02
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 152 18.36 0.77 0.73 2.42
• Cooperative B. 96785 12.63 1.06 0.41 3.32
Aggregate BG 128604 13.12 1.40 0.61 3.58
2. Capitalization
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.06 0.01 0.28 1.81
• Regional, Private B. 6770 0.08 0.04 1.43 5.05
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.03 0.01 0.55 2.88
• Savings B. 25800 0.04 0.01 0.37 3.12
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.03 0.01 0.50 3.66
• Cooperative B. 101360 0.05 0.01 0.71 4.09
Aggregate BG 133673 0.05 0.02 4.46 40.27
3. Liquidity
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.20 0.04 0.51 2.53
• Regional, Private B. 7433 0.29 0.18 0.84 3.70
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.23 0.07 0.22 2.27
• Savings B. 26552 0.32 0.10 0.84 3.78
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.36 0.08 0.41 2.52
• Cooperative B. 101831 0.28 0.10 0.72 3.76
Aggregate BG 135829 0.29 0.11 0.79 4.54
4. Short Interbank Claims
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.03 0.01 0.26 2.43
• Regional, Private B. 6817 0.06 0.07 1.41 5.06
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.06 0.05 1.75 7.42
• Savings B. 25851 0.03 0.04 1.77 7.02
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.12 0.08 0.55 2.59
• Cooperative B. 101183 0.05 0.05 1.72 7.02
Aggregate BG 133158 0.05 0.05 1.66 6.40
-continued on next page-
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N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis
5. Lending to Non-Banks
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.50 0.11 -0.95 3.40
• Regional, Private B. 3395 0.55 0.20 -0.34 2.74
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.40 0.09 -0.44 3.65
• Savings B. 20386 0.61 0.10 -1.34 5.24
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.17 0.07 -0.20 1.74
• Cooperative B. 91683 0.60 0.11 -0.70 3.40
Aggregate BG 115595 0.60 0.11 -0.85 4.09
6. Total Credit to Industries
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.58 0.08 -0.68 3.12
• Regional, Private B. 3043 0.54 0.25 -0.56 2.19
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.45 0.09 -0.19 2.92
• Savings B. 20350 0.45 0.08 -0.28 3.42
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.65 0.16 -0.65 2.21
• Cooperative B. 91309 0.46 0.13 -0.28 4.07
Aggregate BG 114833 0.46 0.12 -0.19 4.44
7. Short-Term Credit to Industries
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.40 0.10 -1.69 5.14
• Regional, Private B. 3036 0.54 0.26 0.13 2.02
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.16 0.09 5.40 48.64
• Savings B. 20342 0.22 0.06 1.14 8.20
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.33 0.09 0.65 4.93
• Cooperative B. 91031 0.26 0.08 0.63 5.22
Aggregate BG 114540 0.26 0.10 2.53 16.53
Notes: Assets (panel 1) are expressed in logarithm. The balance sheet positions
capitalization (panel 2), liquidity (panel 3), interbank claims (panel 4), and total
lending to non-banks (panel 5) are expressed as share of total assets. Lending
to non-banks includes lending to domestic businesses, private households, gov-
ernment, and foreign non-banks. Lending to industries combines bank credit to
businesses and self-employed. Aggregate lending to industries (panel 6) is expressed
as share of total non-bank lending. Short-term lending to industries (panel 7) is
expressed as share of aggregate lending to industries. Bank credit to industries
reflects lending to firms and self-employed. The descriptive statistics for savings
banks are for public rather than for private savings banks. The aggregate banking
group only consists of the primary institutions of the commercial, savings, and
cooperative banking group. The data are from the monthly bank balance sheet
statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table 2: One-Way ANOVA of Bank Balance Sheet Variables, 1992-2002
Panel A Main Banking Groups
Variable Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value
Assets Between Groups 97209 2 48604 39429 ∗
Within Groups 158911 128913 1.23
Capitalization Between Groups 7.10 2 3.53 19356 ∗
Within Groups 24.46 133982 0.000
Liquidity Between Groups 29.96 2 14.98 1350 ∗
Within Groups 1510 136138 0.011
Short-Term Interbank Claims Between Groups 6.25 2 3.12 1290 ∗
Within Groups 323 133467 0.002
Lending to Non-Banks Between Groups 12.15 2 6.08 491 ∗
Within Groups 1431 115592 0.012
Total Credit to Industries Between Groups 20.52 2 10.26 676 ∗
Within Groups 1744 114830 0.015
Short-Term Credit to Industries Between Groups 99.81 2 49.90 13897 ∗
Within Groups 411 114537 0.004
Notes: Assets are expressed in logarithm. Total and short-term credit to industries are expressed
as share of non-bank lending. The remaining variables are expressed in terms of total assets.
The main banking groups are the commercial banking group and the primary institutions of the
savings and credit cooperative banking sector. ∗ denotes the statistical significance at the one
percent level, respectively. The data are from the monthly bank balance sheet statistics of the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Panel B Cooperative Banking Group
Variable Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value
Assets Between Groups 48626 5 9725 15512 ∗
Within Groups 60673 96775 0.627
Capitalization Between Groups 0.24 5 0.047 493 ∗
Within Groups 9.66 100942 0.000
Liquidity Between Groups 34.20 5 6.84 713 ∗
Within Groups 975 101683 0.010
Short-Term Interbank Claims Between Groups 4.06 5 0.811 320 ∗
Within Groups 254 100329 0.003
Lending to Non-Banks Between Groups 31.35 5 6.27 546 ∗
Within Groups 1053 91677 0.011
Total Credit to Industries Between Groups 416 5 83.30 7491 ∗
Within Groups 1015 91303 0.011
Short-Term Credit to Industries Between Groups 42.39 5 8.28 3457 ∗
Within Groups 218 91025 0.002
Notes: The cooperative banking group comprises commercial and rural credit co-
operatives, Raiffeisen banks, Sparda and PSD banks, and civil servants banks. Also
see the notes to panel A.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Bank Lending to Industries, 1992-2002
Aggregate Lending Short-Term Lending
Lending to: N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis
Agr
Commercial BG 942 0.05 0.09 3.75 27.02 3060 0.04 0.10 6.35 48.10
Savings BG 21657 0.04 0.04 3.34 19.57 24292 0.04 0.04 3.06 17.56
Cooperative BG 85636 0.17 0.15 1.36 4.93 93216 0.13 0.13 1.88 7.59
Enr
Commercial BG 1141 0.04 0.08 6.38 56.31 2564 0.04 0.12 6.06 47.45
Savings BG 7922 0.02 0.03 2.94 16.14 17606 0.01 0.02 7.37 95.52
Cooperative BG 8987 0.02 0.02 3.36 20.44 33024 0.01 0.03 9.52 191.63
Con
Commercial BG 1648 0.06 0.04 1.92 10.27 3916 0.06 0.06 2.38 14.02
Savings BG 23390 0.11 0.04 0.95 4.76 25030 0.15 0.06 1.00 4.84
Cooperative BG 86792 0.13 0.06 1.72 12.13 94296 0.17 0.10 1.35 6.64
Trd
Commercial BG 2754 0.24 0.19 2.10 7.53 5308 0.33 0.27 1.23 3.69
Savings BG 23406 0.21 0.05 0.56 5.19 24939 0.25 0.08 0.54 4.23
Cooperative BG 88148 0.19 0.08 1.18 11.15 94422 0.22 0.11 0.98 7.19
Trt
Commercial BG 1320 0.05 0.08 4.25 23.75 3960 0.03 0.05 4.13 28.94
Savings BG 22768 0.04 0.02 3.13 23.98 24720 0.03 0.03 4.06 37.58
Cooperative BG 67973 0.04 0.04 3.57 38.74 83667 0.03 0.06 63.72 8349.04
Fin
Commercial BG 3416 0.05 0.08 4.95 37.49 5088 0.11 0.35 24.50 925.41
Savings BG 24264 0.01 0.01 3.60 28.41 24392 0.01 0.01 8.79 149.53
Cooperative BG 62873 0.01 0.02 18.58 650.47 70116 0.01 0.03 19.00 600.86
Ser
Commercial BG 3416 0.45 0.19 0.46 2.94 5367 0.42 0.98 64.95 4565.16
Savings BG 23575 0.40 0.10 0.16 2.96 25031 0.31 0.12 0.61 3.54
Cooperative BG 91368 0.30 0.13 1.01 6.33 95445 0.25 0.15 1.41 6.85
Mfg
Commercial BG 2375 0.20 0.11 0.68 4.56 4957 0.22 0.18 1.91 10.45
Savings BG 23322 0.20 0.09 1.12 4.87 25039 0.22 0.10 0.91 4.04
Cooperative BG 89332 0.20 0.09 0.87 4.29 95240 0.21 0.11 1.14 6.13
-continued on next page-
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Aggregate Lending Short-Term Lending
Lending to: N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis N Mean Stdev Skew. Kurtosis
C & C
Commercial BG 1414 0.02 0.02 4.53 36.19 2958 0.04 0.12 8.43 92.07
Savings BG 12365 0.01 0.01 2.94 15.19 14576 0.01 0.02 5.59 53.80
Cooperative BG 18463 0.01 0.01 3.96 30.32 26186 0.01 0.02 5.88 56.66
R & P
Commercial BG 1509 0.01 0.01 3.37 21.60 2374 0.02 0.07 10.30 123.91
Savings BG 17890 0.01 0.02 2.65 13.51 19863 0.02 0.02 3.93 28.01
Cooperative BG 34205 0.02 0.02 3.35 21.13 41671 0.02 0.03 5.11 61.45
Nmm
Commercial BG 1435 0.01 0.01 2.90 21.17 2488 0.01 0.02 4.99 44.08
Savings BG 20366 0.01 0.01 3.52 23.85 22571 0.01 0.02 5.54 58.93
Cooperative BG 49307 0.01 0.02 5.44 57.31 57712 0.01 0.03 7.14 110.66
Bm
Commercial BG 1921 0.03 0.03 2.10 9.94 3497 0.03 0.04 3.80 27.58
Savings BG 22388 0.04 0.04 3.63 19.68 24015 0.04 0.05 3.18 16.13
Cooperative BG 73525 0.03 0.04 3.34 22.09 79953 0.03 0.04 3.96 43.46
M & T
Commercial BG 2060 0.04 0.03 1.82 8.85 3824 0.05 0.09 5.82 53.64
Savings BG 21872 0.03 0.02 1.62 6.78 23684 0.04 0.04 2.06 9.34
Cooperative BG 68459 0.03 0.03 2.11 9.60 74417 0.04 0.05 3.01 18.15
E & O
Commercial BG 2104 0.03 0.02 1.47 5.79 3981 0.04 0.07 9.71 144.75
Savings BG 22082 0.02 0.02 4.71 45.39 23743 0.03 0.03 3.69 25.55
Cooperative BG 73033 0.03 0.03 3.41 28.33 79206 0.03 0.04 6.39 158.81
W & P
Commercial BG 2102 0.03 0.02 1.33 6.24 3846 0.03 0.04 2.90 14.05
Savings BG 22842 0.04 0.03 1.92 8.60 24389 0.05 0.04 2.18 10.53
Cooperative BG 83890 0.05 0.04 1.93 9.40 89981 0.06 0.05 4.60 56.21
Txt
Commercial BG 1847 0.02 0.02 3.06 18.45 3604 0.03 0.05 7.32 114.65
Savings BG 20626 0.01 0.02 3.86 25.52 23047 0.02 0.03 4.03 26.49
Cooperative BG 59671 0.02 0.03 4.95 41.06 68737 0.02 0.04 5.52 48.46
Fd
Commercial BG 2088 0.04 0.04 3.89 26.58 3642 0.04 0.04 2.74 15.65
Savings BG 22595 0.03 0.02 1.77 8.21 24263 0.03 0.03 3.81 48.64
Cooperative BG 81489 0.04 0.04 3.44 32.76 87119 0.03 0.04 3.85 28.68
Notes: Agr = agriculture, Enr = energy and mining, Con = construction, Trd = wholesale and retail trade,
Trt = transport and communication, Fin = finance and insurance, Ser = services, Mfg = manufacturing,
C&C = chemicals and coke, R&P = rubber and plastic, Nmm = non-metallic mineral, Bm = metals, M&T =
machinery and transport equipment, E&O = electrical and optical equipment, W&P = wood and paper, Txt
= textiles, Fd = food. Lending to industry i is expressed relative to lending to the grand total of industries.
Aggregate bank credit refers to the sum of short-, medium-, and long-term lending. Short-term lending
describes lending with maturity of less than one year. Commercial banks include big banks, regional, and
private banks. The data are from the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Table 6: Correlation between Industry-Specific Bank Lending and Industry Characteristics
Short-Term Bank Lending
Agg. BG Comm. BG Savings BG Comm. CC Rural CC Raiffeisen BG
N/Y 0.14 ∗∗∗ 0.03 0.23 ∗ 0.25 ∗ 0.40 ∗ 0.55 ∗
K/N -0.25 ∗ -0.17 ∗∗ -0.34 ∗ -0.35 ∗ -0.36 ∗ -0.34 ∗
Firm Size 0.27 0.15 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.47
Openness 0.04 0.07 0.004 0.02 -0.06 -0.15 ∗∗∗
Op. Surplus -0.06 -0.08 ∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.12
Ind. Size 0.55 ∗ 0.62 ∗ 0.44 ∗ 0.43 ∗ 0.38 ∗ 0.30 ∗
Notes: The pairwise correlation coefficients are constructed for aggregate and short-term lending
to 16 industries (agriculture, energy, wholesale and retail trade, transport and communication,
finance and insurance, services, and the nine manufacturing sub-sectors; see Appendix A.1).
The analysis builds on annual data. The data capture the period 1992-2002 for capital intensity,
openness, operating surplus, and industry size and 1999-2000 for firm size. Because of missing
values along the time and cross-section dimension, the number of observations tends to be
lower than 176 (11 years times 16 industries). The correlation coefficients are computed for
the macroeconomic aggregate of short-term bank lending, with short-term credit to industry i
being expressed as share of short-term lending to the grand total of industries. The variables
of industry i are measured relative to the corresponding values for the grand total of industries.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level, respectively.
See section 5 for the data source.
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Table 8: Two-Way ANOVA Test Statistics, Short-Term Lending
Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Statistic
Long-Run Coef.:
∆IP Banking Group 7.25 3 2.42 0.77
Industry 277 14 19.81 6.32∗
∆Price Banking Group 7.16 3 2.39 0.18
Industry 4345 14 310 23.83∗
∆IR Banking Group 0.006 3 0.002 4.61∗
Industry 0.098 14 0.007 16.20∗
Notes:The table reports the ANOVA test statistics for short-term lending. The re-
sults refer to estimations with bank asset size. ∗ denotes the statistical significance
at the one percent level.
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